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Abstract
As the demand for increasingly complex and autonomous systems grows, designers
may consider computational and artificial intelligence methods for more advanced, re-
active control. While the performance gained by such increasingly intelligent systems
may be superior to traditional control techniques, the lack of transparency in the
systems and opportunity for emergent behavior limits their application in the field.
New verification and validation methods must be developed to ensure the output of
such controllers do not put the system or any people interacting with it in danger.
This challenge was highlighted by the former Air Force Chief Scientist in his 2010
Technology Horizons Report, stating “It is possible to develop systems having high
levels of autonomy, but it is the lack of suitable [verification and validation] (V&V)
methods that prevents all but relatively low levels of autonomy from being certified
for use.”
Exhaustive test of complex and autonomous systems is intractable and cost pro-
hibitive; however, design analysis techniques such as formal methods and design
methodologies such as Run Time Assurance (RTA) could provide supplementary cer-
tification evidence early in system design. Incorporating formal methods analysis
throughout the system design process provides a means to identify faults as they
are introduced to drastically reduce the overall system development cost. RTA is a
proposed methodology to allow unproven autonomous controllers to perform within a
predetermined envelope of acceptable behavior, allowing the burden of testing to be
spread across the entire system lifecycle. The performance of the system is monitored
by a decision module that includes a set of acceptable conditions and behaviors. If
the system operates outside of pre-determined conditions or any of the acceptable
iv
behavior ranges are violated, the decision module switches control from the unproven
autonomous controller to an appropriate recovery controller that may be fully proven
using conventional design time verification methods, coupled with formal methods or
other alternative verification techniques. Supplementing traditional verification tools
with enhanced alternative tools such as formal methods or online verification methods
as RTA will enable verification of more complex nonlinear problems that the United
States Air Force (USAF) is facing.
In this research, a nonlinear model was chosen because it stresses the formal
methods analysis tools to expose areas where they could be enhanced. A 6U Cube-
Sat Attitude Control Subsystem (ACS) is used as a challenge problem to evaluate
the application of non-traditional verification methodologies such as formal methods
and run time assurance architectures in conjunction with more traditional verification
techniques. Thirteen hypothetical requirements are presented and formally defined.
Strengths and weaknesses of the verification techniques are exposed in order to recom-
mend capability expansions for further development. In analyzing the application of
different formal methods tools, a new approach to verification was created to provide
evidence of requirement satisfaction that leverages the capabilities of formal methods
in conjunction with traditional verification techniques such as simulation cases, space
filling experimental design simulation, and mathematical feasibility analysis.
v
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EVALUATION OF VERIFICATION APPROACHES APPLIED TO NONLINEAR
SYSTEM CONTROL
I. Introduction
1.1 Motivation
On September 16, 2014, Major General Thomas Masiello, commander of the Air
Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), announced autonomy as one of AFRL’s three
“Game Changing Technologies.”[67] The introduction of unmanned systems in mod-
ern warfare has significantly improved warfighter capabilities by providing greater
access and intelligence in hazardous environments. Autonomous control systems that
sense their environment, compensate for system failures, and respond in spite of un-
certainty by rapidly deciding and acting on their own are highly desired across many
disciplines and organizations. The definition of autonomy is heavily debated;[73] how-
ever, most agree that a spectrum exists between automation and increasingly higher
levels of autonomy and machine “self consciousness.”
Increasingly automatic and autonomous control systems promise better perfor-
mance in dynamic environments; however, traditional exhaustive verification and
validation (V&V) techniques are insufficient and cost prohibitive to evaluate the soft-
ware underlying these complex systems with extremely large or infinite state spaces.
The cost to develop and test new complex systems for the Air Force is on an expo-
nential curve that inspired Norman Augustine, former Chairman of Lockheed Martin
Corporation, to famously predict that “in the year 2054, the entire defense budget will
purchase just one aircraft.”[15] New approaches to V&V must be developed to deal
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with new highly complex systems. The former Air Force Chief Scientist highlighted
the need for alternative verification and validation methods in his 2010 Technology
Horizons Report, stating “It is possible to develop systems having high levels of au-
tonomy, but it is the lack of suitable V&V methods that prevents all but relatively
low levels of autonomy from being certified for use.”[39]
While certification of autonomous systems encompasses both hardware and soft-
ware V&V, the software that defines the autonomous decision making capability
arguably presents the largest challenge. Software certification is challenging even
without the incorporation of autonomy. The Systems Engineering “V” with descrip-
tions of when software faults are introduced, found, and the relative cost to fix the
fault is shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Introduction, Identification, and Cost to Correct Software Faults [47][10][32]
Feiler [47] estimates that 70% of software cost is rework and certification.[47]
In addition, 70% of software faults are introduced early in the development cycle,
but only 3.5% of those faults are found early; over 80% of faults are found after
unit test when the estimated nominal cost for fault removal is 20-1000 times higher
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than at early design stages.[10] Investing in V&V earlier in the design enables earlier
error detection when the costs associated with a design change are much lower than
later in the design process. In a 2014 report [32], the Verification and Validation of
Complex and Autonomous Systems (VVCAS) Team, which the author of this thesis is
a member of, at AFRL’s Aerospace Systems Directorate described the need to expand
the current V&V paradigm and the benefits that may be realized from expansion.
In traditional systems engineering practices, V&V is conducted after the sys-
tem design is complete via modeling, simulation, and test. As software complexity
increases, depending on traditional V&V practices alone becomes intractable and
infeasible. A combination of run time assurance (RTA) design principles, correct-by-
construction code synthesis, and formal methods-based analytical proofs could sup-
plement and reduce reliance on traditional simulation and flight test evidence. The
VVCAS team envisions a systems engineering practice that supplements traditional
modeling, simulation, test, and evaluation techniques with analytical V&V evidence
generated throughout the system engineering process and run time monitoring and
bounding of system performance. Following publication of the 2014 report [32], this
vision was also adopted by the Assistant Secretary of Defense/Research and Engi-
neering (ASD/R&E) endorsing the Department of Defense (DoD) Autonomy Test
and Evaluation, Verification and Validation (TEVV) Investment Strategy.[11]
1.2 Problem Statement
The objective of this research is to evaluate formal methods analysis (FMA) ap-
proaches and RTA in the context of solving the exhaustive testing problem. RTA
architectures and FMA are not widely used and are still areas of active research. Ap-
plying a compositional RTA architecture backed by FMA during the requirements,
architecture, and modeling design phases could provide reusable verification evidence
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that a controller implementation meets a set of requirements. A formally verified
RTA architecture provides a foundation for the insertion of a nondeterministic or
intelligent controller that employs artificial intelligence and learning. The online veri-
fication provided by an RTA controller at runtime is predicated on oﬄine verification
of its verified backup controller and decision module subcomponents. The backup
controller subcomponent is verified to provide a safe alternative control solution if
an intelligent controller fails, while the decision module subcomponent is verified to
switch to the backup controller if the unverified intelligent controller approaches a
boundary that would violate one of the system’s safety properties. To generate a ver-
ified backup controller, formal methods analysis techniques are applied to a non-linear
proportional, integral, derivative (PID) control system to supplement traditional sim-
ulation techniques. This research will provide insight into the capabilities and gaps of
RTA architectures and formal methods V&V techniques when applied to the control
design of a nonlinear system. A 6U CubeSat Attitude Control Subsystem (ACS) is
selected as the nonlinear control challenge problem.
1.3 Research Focus
The primary objective of this research is evaluate the combination of traditional
simulation analysis with non-traditional verification techniques to generate verifica-
tion evidence that a nonlinear controller will meet performance requirements and
never exceed safety constraints. The combination of traditional verification methods,
including feasibility analysis (FA) to see if a requirement is possible, a simulation case
(SIM) and space filling experimental design simulation (SFEDS), and non-traditional
verification methods, including RTA and FMA, conducted in this research has not
previously been applied to a nonlinear control system design to the best of the author’s
knowledge. The strengths and limitations of each of these analysis techniques will
4
be evaluated and recommendations will be made based on the results for appropriate
use of each technique in control systems analysis. In addition, recommendations will
be made for generating appropriate requirements to enable the use of the variety of
techniques explored in this research.
1.4 Methodology
A combination of RTA, FMA, SIM, and SFEDS are applied to a nonlinear control
system in the following steps:
1. The requirements and derived requirements resulting from design decisions
(such as the type of actuator) are generated for the control system, and spe-
cific safety requirements are identified. These requirements are formalized by
assigning precise mathematical and logical definitions.
2. FMA is performed during requirements, architecture, and modeling phases of
the nonlinear PID controller design to prove that the PID controller implemen-
tation will not violate safety requirements. The Specification and Analysis of
Requirements (SpeAR) framework is used to apply model checking and lim-
ited theorem proving analysies to the controller requirements to show that the
derived requirements of the system implementation satisfy the safety require-
ments of the system. The Assume Guarantee Reasoning Environment (AGREE)
annex is used to complete assume-guarantee contract analysis on the architec-
ture of the controller written in the Architecture Analysis & Design Language
(AADL) to show that the architecture implementation satisfies safety require-
ments. Simulink Design Verifier (SLDV) is used to apply FMA to the Simulink
model of the controller to prove that the modeled implementation of the con-
troller satisfies the safety requirements.
5
3. SIM is applied to the nonlinear PID control system to show satisfaction of the
performance requirements.
4. SIM is expanded through the selection of 257 test points and application of
SFEDS to analyze under what conditions the performance requirements are
held by the nonlinear PID control system over a set of initial and final system
states.
5. The PID controller is inserted as the verified controller in a RTA controller im-
plementation. The RTA controller monitors the output of a “black box,” “gray
box,” or “white box” unverified controller with a decision module component
that switches to the formally verified PID controller output if any performance
boundaries are expected to be violated within the next timestep. FMA is ap-
plied to the verified controller and decision module outputs of the RTA con-
troller in requirements, architecture, and model phases using SpeAR, AGREE,
and SLDV to prove safety requirements are not violated. FMA is then applied
to the composition of the RTA controller as a system with three subcomponents
in the requirements and architecture with SpeAR and AGREE to show that the
combination of the three subcomponents will never violate the controller safety
requirements.
These steps are visualized in Figure 2, where the requirements, implementation,
and verification portions of the research are organized in vertical column-like orien-
tations identified by three brackets at the top of the figure. The different verification
portions of the research are further identified as “traditional” versus “non-traditional”
using brackets on the right side of Figure 2. The numbers in circles indicate portions
of the diagram identified earlier in this section. For instance, step 5 includes the
development of the decision module, composition of the RTA, and FMA of the RTA
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Figure 2. Development and Analysis Flow Diagram
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and its three subcomponents. The two boxes with dotted outlines are left for future
work, although a placeholder for an intelligent unverified controller is included in all
the models in step 5.
A summary of the models developed as a part of this research and the types of
analysis conducted on them is shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3. Thesis Research Models and Analysis Techniques
As seen in Figure 3, three models are used in the analysis: a model of the actuator
and plant properties only, an RTA controller with an abstract unverified controller
component, and an RTA controller with a velocity ramp substituted for the unverified
controller. Also seen in Figure 3, five types of analysis techniques are conducted.
Arrows from the models to the analysis type are used to clarify what portions of the
model are analyzed with the technique, where arrows from the RTA controller model
boxes indicate that the RTA controller and all of its subcomponents are analyzed
using that technique. Traditional models and analyses are contained in solid boxes
while nontraditional models and analyses are contained in dotted line boxes.
A 6U CubeSat ACS is selected as the nonlinear controller challenge problem to
evaluate the non-traditional V&V tools and techniques applied in this research. The
complex control algorithms and equations of motion that describe the 6U CubeSat
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ACS challenge the limits of the non-traditional verification tools and provide a robust
example on which to evaluate the feasibility of the approach and identify gaps in tool
technique capabilities, as well as appropriateness of the tools for nonlinear control
system analysis.
1.5 Assumptions and Limitations
The RTA, FMA, SIM, and SFEDS tools and techniques applied to the analysis of
the nonlinear controller do not provide complete coverage of the design. A nonlinear
control design was selected because it is expected to be on the edge of the analysis
capabilities of the FMA and RTA tools and techniques used in this research. This
research is limited to a theoretical and simulated spacecraft attitude control system.
There are additional limitations in the physical modeling of the system that will be
described in Section 4.4.3.
1.6 Scope and Contribution
The scope of this research is verification of the early design stages of a theoretical
RTA controller design. The RTA controller’s verified controller and decision module
subcomponents and the composition of the RTA are analyzed with FMA to prove
that safety requirements of the system are never violated. In addition, a nonlinear
PID controller is developed and its performance is analyzed with SIM and SFEDS to
understand under what conditions performance requirements may be violated.
The contributions of this work are:
1. The first application and evaluation of SpeAR, AGREE, and SLDV to provide
traceable verification evidence for a nonlinear system control in the require-
ments, architecture and modeling design phases;
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2. An exploration of how to formally describe different classes of requirements
typically associated with control systems design;
3. Recommendations for the appropriate use of RTA, FMA, SIM, and SFEDS in
control system analysis;
4. Recommendations for requirements specification best practices to enable FMA,
SIM, and SFEDS;
5. Recommendations for improvements in FMA tools that would allow more anal-
ysis coverage of control system design space; and
6. Development of a systematic methodology to combine RTA, FMA, SIM, and
SFEDS in a modular design that enables reuse of verification evidence from
component requirements, architectures and models in the development of new
and modified systems.
1.7 Preview
Chapter I provided the motivation, problem statement, research focus, method-
ology, assumptions and limitations, and scope of the research. Chapter II provides
background information on cyber-physical systems theory that could be used to de-
scribe most modern control systems, requirements specification best practices, FMA
techniques and tools, examples of spacecraft failures that could have been prevented
had formal methods been applied, a description and history of RTA, and background
on SFEDS. Chapter III describes AFIT’s CubeSat Testbed and ACS components, as
well as mathematical descriptions of the underlying spacecraft attitude dynamics for
the challenge problem. Chapter IV introduces and explores how to formally describes
the requirements set used in the verification of the nonlinear control design, presents
the architecture and model of the PID and RTA controller designs, and describes the
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set up of the FMA, SIM, and SFEDS used to determine requirement satisfaction.
Chapter V presents the results from the FMA, SIM, and SFEDS. Chapter VI pro-
vides conclusions from the research, discusses possible extensions and future work,
discusses gaps in toolset capabilities, and makes recommendations for improvements
to the analysis toolsets.
11
II. Specification and Verification Techniques
Chapter II provides background on specification and analysis techniques that are
used in this research. First, an introduction to cyber-physical systems theory is pre-
sented with concepts such as component composition that are used to design models
of the nonlinear control system and its environment, finite state machines that are
used as part of the FMA, determinism and nondetermism that are used to design
the SFEDS analysis, and requirements categories that are used to describe each of
the requirements introduced in the next chapter. In addition, characteristics of good
requirements are presented that are used to develop and describe the requirements
in the next chapter. Requirements verification is defined and several methods are
presented to show requirement satisfaction, including all of the methods that are im-
plemented in this research. The foundational principles behind formal methods such
as propositional logic, formal languages and FMA analysis capabilities and limita-
tions are described. The FMA analysis tools SpeAR, AGREE, and SLDV used in
this research are introduced. The importance of FMA as a non-traditional analysis
technique is described by providing examples of catastrophic spacecraft failures that
occurred because of design faults that can now be caught automatically with formal
methods. The history and application of RTA is described, which is used later in
this research to develop a control architecture that can facilitate an intelligent con-
troller within a construct that is proven to never violate safety properties. SFEDS
is described, which is applied to the design to verify many of the requirements that
cannot be proven using formal methods.
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2.1 Cyber-Physical Systems
The spacecraft attitude control design used as a challenge problem for verification
and validation techniques is an example of a cyber-physical system. The field of cyber-
physical systems research emerged in the early 2000s when processing capabilities,
wireless communication, and sensors had matured enough technologically and became
more affordable for widespread use. Rajeev Alur states that a cyber-physical system
“consists of a collection of computing devices communicating with one another and
interacting with the physical world via sensors and actuators in a feedback loop.”[14]
This description fits most modern control systems.
Cyber-physical systems have five key features: Reactive computation, concur-
rency, feedback control, real time computation, and safety critical applications.[14]
Reactive computation describes a cyber-physical system’s interaction with the out-
side world in terms of inputs and outputs. These systems compute an output based
on an input signal using a specific function. Concurrency describes the ability of
these systems to conduct multiple threads of computation in the form of compo-
nents or processes simultaneously, in contrast to sequential systems which execute
a sequence of instructions one at a time. Concurrent systems may be synchronous
where all computations progress in fixed frames coordinated by the system’s clock,
or asynchronous where computations may be executed at independent time intervals.
Feedback control refers to the discipline of control systems engineering. While tradi-
tional control theory focuses on designs for continuous-time systems, cyber-physical
systems consist of discrete software executing concurrent computations that interact-
ing with a continuously evolving physical environment. In this way, cyber-physical
systems can also be described as hybrid systems because they contain a mix of dis-
crete and continuous dynamics. Real time computation refers to the study of timing
delays, time-depended coordination protocols, and resource-allocation strategies to
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meet requirements and ensure predictability. Safety-critical applications are those
where performance and development cost may be prioritized lower than the safety of
the system. Cyber-physical systems theory is relevant to this research because the
nonlinear control system in this design features reactive computation, concurrency,
and feedback control, and could be considered a safety critical application in terms of
safety of the hardware components from damage. This research does not investigate
any real time computation concerns.
2.1.1 Synchronous Cyber-Physical Systems Models
Synchronous cyber-physical system models are comprised of discrete components
that conduct computations in a sequence of frames. In each frame, components read
their input(s), compute output(s) based on the input(s) and update the components
internal state(s). The synchrony hypothesis is the assumption that the system is
ready to processes new inputs when external inputs change and these external inputs
do not change during a computational frame, is based on an assumption that all
the computations and communications required to determine variable values occurs
instantaneously.[14] This assumption simplifies designs and allows designers better
predictability. Synchronous models are comprised of functional and reactive com-
ponents. Functional components compute an output when supplied by inputs and
reactive components interact with other components and maintain and internal state.
The system model used in this research is assumed to be a synchronous cyber-physical
system, and a unit delay between the environment and controller subsystems segments
model computation into discrete frames. In this research, the functional component
is the controller, which contains the control software, and the reactive component is
the environment, which contains the actuators and plant.
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Table 1. Variable and Expression Types[14]
Type Description
nat natural number
int integer
real real number
bool boolean value in set of 0,1
enumerated finite number of symbolic constants in a set x1,x2, ... ,xn
Table 2. Logical Operators[14]
Symbol Name Evaluation Description
¬ negation ¬e is 1 when e is 0 “not”
∧ conjunction e1 ∧ e2 is 1 when e1 and e2 are both 1 “and”
∨ disjunction e1 ∨ e2 is 1 when at least e1 or e2 are 1 “or”
→ implication e1 → e2 is 1 when e1 is 0 or e2 is 1 “implies”
2.1.2 Components
Alur describes components are in terms of variables, valuations, expressions, in-
puts, outputs, and states, which are all an integral part of this research. Variables and
expressions are assigned types, described in Table 1. A valuation is an assignment of a
value to a variable consistent with the variable type. Expressions e may be numerical
when assigned a type of nat, int, or real and are constructed with constants; primi-
tive operations, such as addition and multiplication; comparison operators, such as ≤;
and appropriately-typed variables. Expressions may also be Boolean and constructed
with logical operators in addition to the components of numerical expressions. These
logical operators are summarized in Table 2. All of the requirements analyzed in this
research are formalized as Boolean expressions. In general, a cyber-physical compo-
nent C = (I, O, S, Init, React) is comprised of sets of typed input variables I, typed
output variables O, typed state variables S, initial states Init, and a reaction descrip-
tion React, where QI is the set of all possible inputs to C (I ∈ QI), QO is the set of
all possible outputs from C (O ∈ QO), and QS is the set of all possible states of C
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(S ∈ QS). In finite-state components, each set of variables is finite. If a component
C only has input variables I and output variables O, but no state variables S, such
as an if-else statement that combines the inputs to define the output, it is considered
a combinational component. Some components may only conduct computations in a
frame when triggered by one of the inputs, rather than in every frame. These com-
ponents are called event-triggered and consist of a subset J of the input variables I
that act as triggers.[14]
In this research, the system is broken down into components C as described in
Section 4.3.1. Much of the analysis in this research is focused on analysis the typed
inputs I and outputs O, such as whether the outputs of the controller components will
violate safety constraints. The typed state variables S in this research correspond to
four states that describe the orientation of the spacecraft, three states that describe
the angular velocity of the spacecraft and four states that describe the angular velocity
of the four reaction wheel actuators, as described in Section 3.2.5. Where appropriate,
assumptions are used to constrain the set of all possible inputs QI and the set of
all possible states QS to ranges of physically possible to focus FMA and eliminate
spurious results. The FMA is used to determine whether the set of all possible
outputs QO contain values that violate safety constraints. While there are not event-
triggered components in this research, future extensions of this research may include
event-triggered components that are only used when faults occur or in other specific
conditions.
2.1.3 Importance of Initialization
Initial states and how components react to inputs and each state must be specified
in cyber-physical systems theory.[14] The initial value of a variable should be assigned
when the variable is declared. Some programming languages and styles allow multiple
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initial values to be specified using a choose function which randomly assigns a chosen
value from the argument set. These argument sets could include a set or a range
of values. Initialization is an important concept used in the FMA portion of this
research.
2.1.4 Composition of Components
Three main operations are used to compose components of cyber-physical systems
to create larger, more capable components: instantiation, parallel composition, and
output hiding.[14] In instantiation, multiple instances of the same component may
be used with different input and output variable names.[14] In this research, a single
model of a reaction wheel is created and multiple instances with unique input and
output names are used to create an array model.
Parallel composition combines two or more individual components or instances of
components into a single component that captures the synchronous interaction of each
individual component running concurrently.[14] In this research, parallel composition
is used in the abstraction of sensor components. The sensor and actuator components
can be composed in parallel because the output of the actuator is the same as the
input to the sensor. If the communication is synchronous, as it is in this research,
the actuator model reads its input, produces an output and updates its internal
state to record the current value in the same round that the sensor model reads its
input from the actuator, computes its output, and updates its internal state. Parallel
composition features the following properties: it is commutative, associative, and
finite or deterministic when comprised of finite or deterministic components, and the
number of states is a product of the number of states of each component.
Output hiding combines two or more individual components so that only one input
and output are shown to the outside world and the remaining inputs and outputs
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that are not showing are local variables.[14] Output hiding allows for the hierarchical
composition of components rather than a single monolithic design that places all
components at the same level. In this research, output hiding is used at the system
level to examine inputs and outputs of the RTA controller and the environment, while
hiding the inputs and outputs of the internal components of the RTA controller and
the environment.
2.1.5 State-Space Explosion Problem
One of the consequences of composing states is that the number of states grows
exponentially with the number of components. For instance, if you were to compose n
instances of a delay component C1 with n1 states in a chain that outputs the input of
the chain from n frames earlier it would have nn1 states. The exponential relationship
between states and the number of components is sometimes referred to as the state-
space explosion problem which has limited the scalability of analysis tools. In this
research, composition is used to mitigate state-space explosion by conducting analysis
at the component level, and using the results of that analysis to constrain analysis
for other components. For example, in this research, a rate-limited PID controller
is used as the verified controller component of an RTA controller and is analyzed
in isolation to ensure that it meets safety constraints placed on the output. The
proof results of the rate-limited PID controller analysis are used as assumptions on
the verified controller input to the RTA controllers decision to constrain the range
of values used in the FMA analysis. This assumption allows proof to be generated
that the decision module component output will not violate safety constraints and
prevents identification of a spurious counterexample showing that the decision module
violates the safety constraints based on an infeasible input from the rate-limited PID
controller.
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2.1.6 Finite State Machines
Model-based design often uses finite state machines (FSM) to describe the be-
havior of the system.[14] Each state variable is a mode of the state machine, and
are drawn as circles in state machine diagrams. Arrows are used to show transitions
between the modes, with a single sourceless arrow used to describe the initial mode.
Extended state machines use additional state variables to augment the modes of the
machine. Mode-switches are used to specify the reactions of the extended state ma-
chine and are depicted as an edge between two modes with a guard condition and
expression to update the variables. Finite and extended state machines are essen-
tial concepts in cyber-physical systems as well as the FMA techniques used in this
research.
2.1.7 Determinism and Nondeterminism
An algorithm is said to be deterministic if it produces a unique and repeatable
result given the same set of inputs. In cyber-physical systems, a component is de-
terministic if “for a given sequence of inputs, the component has a unique execution
producing a unique sequence of outputs. Such deterministic behavior is ensured if
the component has a single initial state, and in every state, for a given input, there
is exactly one possible reaction.”[14] In contrast, nondeterministic algorithms and
components may produce different output sequences given the same input sequence.
Nondeterministic models are useful for modeling an environment which cannot be
completely captured by the model. The notion of non-deterministic algorithms were
first introduced in computer science by Robert Floyd in a 1967 when he demonstrated
the use of a non-deterministic algorithm to solve the problem of placing 8 queens on
a chessboard so that no two were in the same row, same column or diagonal from one
another. Two things that set nondeterministic algorithms apart from deterministic
19
algorithms are their use of some sort of chose function and their branching rather than
sequential computational strategy. In the algorithms presented by Floyd, the end of
each branch is labeled as a success or failure. Floyd differentiates non-deterministic
algorithms from probabilistic, random, and Monte Carlo algorithms, by describing
the non-deterministic algorithms as representations of systematic search procedures
that are governed by some final goal.[48] The controller and dynamics models used
in this research are deterministic.
2.2 Requirements Specification
Wiegers [99] states that quality requirements should be correct, feasible, necessary,
prioritized, unambiguous, verifiable, complete, consistent, modifiable and traceable.
In this research, formalizing and analyzing requirements helps to ensure that require-
ments are unambiguous, consistent, and verifiable, and a naming convention described
in Section 4.1.3 is used to ensure the requirements are traceable. Ensuring that the
requirements are correct, feasible, necessary, prioritized, complete, and modifiable is
done with the help of a subject matter expert (SME), and is not the focus of this
research.
2.2.1 Requirement Categories
Alur [14] categorizes requirements as safety or liveness. Safety requirements could
be thought of as stating “nothing bad ever happens” while liveness requirement could
be thought of as stating “something good eventually happens.”[14] Safety require-
ments classify states of the system as safe or unsafe and assert that unsafe states
should not be reachable. A safety requirement is often an invariant of the sys-
tem, which is defined as property of the system which is satisfied in every reachable
state.[14] Transition systems may be used to describe how a state variables update in
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each frame. Alur defines transitions systems T = (S, Init, T rans) as having a finite
set of typed state variables S within a set of all possible states QS (S ∈ QS), an
initial set of states Init, and a transition description Trans. Reachable states may
then be defined as all possible states that can be achieved given an initial state and
transition description.[14] A property ϕ is a Boolean-valued expression e over the
state variables of the transition system T . If no reachable state of T violates ϕ, then
ϕ is considered an invariant property. If at least one reachable state of T satisfies
ϕ then it is called a reachable property, or a liveness requirement.[14] Liveness and
invariant requirements are specified using temporal logic.[14]
In this research, the majority of the requirements listed in Section 4.1.1 fall into
the categories of liveness or invariants, with the exception of a few requirements
that deal with specific control systems characteristics such as settling time, percent
overshoot, and rise time. In addition, the system used in this research could be
considered a transition system T with 11 states S describing the position and angular
velocity of the spacecraft and the angular velocity of the reaction wheels, a range of
possible values for each state QS, an initial set for each state Init, and a transition
description Trans provided by the model of the controller and system dynamics.
2.2.2 Requirements Verification
The Defense Acquisition University (DAU) states verification “confirms that a
system element meets design-to or build-to specifications. Throughout the systems
life cycle, design solutions at all levels of the physical architecture are verified through
a cost-effective combination of analysis, examination, demonstration, and testing, all
of which can be aided by modeling and simulation.”[94] In other words, verification
confirms that a system implementation satisfied requirements. As discussed in this
definition of verification, there are many ways to show requirement satisfaction. In
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this research, the following verification methods are used to show requirement satis-
faction:
1. Feasibility Analysis (FA): Show that it is mathematically possible for the system
as designed to satisfy a particular requirement.
2. FMA: Use a formal methods analysis technique such as model checking to for-
mally prove that the requirement will never be violated.
3. SIM: Show that the requirements are met in a representative simulation case.
4. SFEDS: Determine whether the requirements are satisfied in multiple simula-
tions across a set of test points and identify regions where the requirement is
or is not satisfied.
2.3 Formal Methods
The NASA Langley Formal Method Group defines formal methods as “mathe-
matically rigorous techniques and tools for the specification, design and verification
of software and hardware systems.”[25] This field of study relies on the foundational
belief that mathematically rigorous statements (i.e., well-formed mathematical logic)
used to form specifications of a system can be verified through an exhaustive process
to determine the correctness of a system. FMA is used in this research to prove
that the controller cannot violate safety constraint requirements. In this section,
propositional logic, theories, and processes that provide the foundation for FMA are
described and the capabilities and limitations of formal methods tools are discussed.
2.3.1 Propositional Logic
Propositional logic forms the basis for formal methods analysis. A proposition
is a declarative statement that makes a claim which can be proven true or false.
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The proposition should be atomic or indecomposable. These atomic propositions, or
”atoms” typically represented symbolically as p, q, or r, can be composed to convey
a more complex concept. Natural deduction allows the inference of a conclusion from
propositions with a set of proof rules. Applying proof rules to formulas, represented
with ϕ and often referred to as ”premises” or ”propositions,” one may obtain more
formulas until a ”conclusion,” represented by ψ, can be proven.
2.3.2 Temporal Logic
Temporal logic is a methodology to represent and reason about systems in time by
discretizing time into time steps.[90] Linear temporal logic (LTL), models sequences
of events in a linear progression along a single path; “all” and “exists” operators have
no meaning in LTL.[16] Computational tree logic (CTL) models time in a branch-
ing tree-like structure, where the branches represent different decisions that may be
made; “there exists a path” and “along all paths” may be defined in CTL.[31] Timed
Computational Tree Logic (TCTL) is a CTL extension that includes continuous time
propositions, and is the “mathematical foundation of timed-automata finite state ma-
chines.” [31][16] Requirements specified in formal methods tools such as SpeAR or
AGREE are translated into temporal logic as a part of the analysis process.
2.3.3 Formal Methods Theories and Processes
A formally designed system can be checked by an algorithmic process (typically
with model checkers or theorem provers). Model checking was introduced Clarke and
Emerson [33] and Queille and Sifakis [75] in early 1980s as an automatic verifica-
tion technique for concurrent systems with finite states. Model checking is capable
of evaluating if a model satisfies a requirement expressed in temporal logic.[53] The
technique utilizes graph theory to build finite models to exhaustively examine and
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verify the correctness of decision mode logic and discrete state machines.[34] Model
checking tools utilize various techniques to be able to reason on these systems such as
binary decision diagrams (BDDs) [13], k-induction [42], and property directed reach-
ability [46]. Model checking produces either a proof or a counter example. A proof
is produced if no violation of a formal specification was discovered in the exploration
of the FSM. A counterexample is a trace through the FSM that illustrates how the
formalized specification could be violated. Model checkers describe the techniques to
examine the FSM, not how the individual case is determined to be upheld or is valid.
Feasibility at specific state machine locations is leveraged off of the use of satisfia-
bilty (SAT) solvers or Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT) solvers that add modulo
theory to SAT capabilities. These tools perform the specific node analysis to provide
the model checker results that can be utilized in many of the techniques mentioned
previously. Some examples of solvers include Yices1[44], Yices2, CVC4[19], Z3[41],
MathSAT[24], and SMTInterpol[28].
2.3.4 Formal Methods Analysis Capabilities and Limitations
Formal methods analysis techniques are capable of generating comprehensive proof
that some types of requirements will never be violated. While formal methods tech-
niques are best suited for high level mode logic, they can be adapted to prove prop-
erties of control systems such as a requirement that a calculation will never exceed a
particular value. These proof capabilities are severely limited for nonlinear systems;
however, formal methods are highly capable of analyzing non-functional requirements,
as will be discussed in this section.
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2.3.4.1 Nonlinear Systems Analysis
Linear functions are proportional to the input variables of the function, such as
f(x) = mx+ b where m and b are constants and x is the variable. In other words, if
a function only contains addition and multiplication by a constant value, it is linear;
however, if a function contains two variables multiplied together, creating a polyno-
mial with an order of two or higher, it is nonlinear. The controller and dynamics
equations used in this research are nonlinear, meaning that they are products of mul-
tiple variables. These nonlinear equations are not well suited for analysis in SpeAR,
AGREE, or Simulink Design Verifier because none of these tools currently support
nonlinear math; however, SpeAR and AGREE allow users to select which SMT solver
to use for the formal methods analysis, and Z3 is an option that provides some support
for nonlinear math, so it is possible to expand SpeAR and AGREE capabilities to
leverage more of Z3’s capabilities in the future. While many of the requirements can
be expressed in the tools, very limited analysis can be completed because nonlinear
control equations and equations of motion define whether or not the requirements are
met; however future versions of SpeAR, AGREE, and Simulink Design Verifier may
be able to analyze some low order nonlinear systems.
2.3.4.2 Non-Functional Requirement Analysis
While functional requirements describe the behavior of a system or subsystem,
non-functional requirements describe properties such as cost, power, and weight that
can often be described mathematically. Analysis was conducted on a sample atti-
tude control subsystem that contained a reaction wheel array, listed as RWA, and
a magnetic torque actuator, described as MT. In SpeAR, the high level subsystem
requirements are listed as “Properties,” while derived requirements that describe the
components selected to meet subsystem requirements are listed as “Requirements.”
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In this example, the cost, mass, and power of the RWA and MT are shown to meet
the total subsystem requirements. The analysis shows that all properties are proven
valid, as shown in Figure 4. The requirements and properties written in SpeAR are
shown in Figure 5.
Figure 4. Non-functional Requirement Analysis Results in SpeAR
Figure 5. Non-functional Requirements Analysis Example in SpeAR
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2.4 Formal Methods Tools
This section provides a description of the three formal methods tools used in
this research to analyze the requirements, architecture, and model of the nonlinear
controller. A description of how the tools can be used together in an incremental
design process is presented.
2.4.1 Requirements Analysis with SpeAR
There are currently two competing approaches to generating formal requirements:
parsing natural language requirements documents and manually constructing formal
requirements using patterns and templates. The first approach, language parsing,
is the subject of research programs such as Automatic Requirements Specification
Extraction from Natural Language (ARSENAL), which uses semantic parsing and
refinement techniques to generate a formal model in LTL.[50] The advantage of the
parsing approach is that it does not require SMEs to learn a formal specification
language, and existing requirements documents can be automatically parsed rather
than regenerated by hand in a specification language. The disadvantage of parsing is
that it requires that the natural language requirements document have all the con-
tent necessary to construct a formal model in LTL. The second approach, manual
construction of formal requirements specifications, is the subject of a the research
tool underdevelopment by Rockwell Collins and AFRL called SpeAR, which allows
subject matter experts (SMEs) to write system requirements in peer-reviewed spec-
ification templates [45] that facilitate formal analysis. Manually constructing formal
requirements using patterns and templates may require a SME to learn these patterns,
however, this method has two major advantages. First, expressing requirements in a
formalized notation gives them a precise, mathematical meaning, and requires SMEs
to unambiguously state what the true meaning of each requirement is so that the
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intent of the requirement is not lost. Second, using a tool such as SpeAR to write for-
malized requirements, allows translation of the requirements into multiple temporal
logic languages that can be input into a variety of model checking or theorem proving
engines.
By comparing system requirements to high level system properties in a model
checker, requirements and derived requirements added throughout the design of the
system can be analyzed for completeness and consistency. The properties and re-
quirements documented in SpeAR are translated into a Lustre [56] model and sent to
JKind,[49] a k-induction model checker.[42] JKind uses Satisfiability Modulo Theory
(SMT) solvers, such as Z3,[41] to inductively prove that a given model meets its for-
mal specification. In the instance of SpeAR, the model is defined by the formalized
system requirements and the specification defined by its properties. JKind will either
report that the systems properties are satisfied by the given requirements, or it will
provide a sequence of inputs, referred to as a counterexample, that demonstrates how
a property can be violated. This counterexample can be used by domain experts to
refine either the requirements or the properties until a proof is obtained.
All of the requirements in SpeAR are Boolean expressions that can be evaluated
as true or false. An example requirement written in SpeAR is shown in Figure 6.
//R01 The commanded change of angular velocity from the
control algorithm shall not exceed the maximum allowable
angular acceleration of the reaction wheel.
r 01a ctrl = global :: always psi dot comm 1 <= MAX PSI DOT RW
and psi dot comm 1 >= -MAX PSI DOT RW; //[rad p s 2]
Figure 6. SpeAR Example
The first requirement of the reaction wheel attitude control system is that the ac-
celeration command from the controller should not exceed the maximum allowable
acceleration of the reaction wheel. As will be discussed in Section 4.1.1, requirement
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R01 is a safety property set by the physical limitations of the motor, control system,
and power supply, and is designed to prevent damage to the reaction wheel assem-
bly. The requirement is broken out for each individual reaction wheel, and the first
wheel sub requirement is documented as r 01a ctrl, which is a naming convention
where r indicates that it is a requirement versus an assumption, 01 is the number
of the requirement, a is the first sub requirement, and ctrl denotes that it is a
controller subsystem requirement. The requirement is interpreted formally as: un-
der any conditions (globally) the commanded change of angular velocity (represented
here as psi dot comm 1) is always less than or equal to the maximum allowable
angular acceleration of the system (MAX PSI DOT RW) and greater than or equal to
the negative of the maximum allowable angular acceleration. Both the negative and
positive limits are included because they represent the maximum velocity in different
directions.
One of the strengths of SpeAR is the ability to express and analyze non-functional
requirements that describe non-functional properties. For instance, satellites usually
have strict requirements on maximum weight, cost, and power consumption. If the
satellite includes multiple subsystems with multiple components, designers can specify
requirements for each subsystem and its components and verify that the sum each of
the individual subsystems and their components do not violate the overall spacecraft
requirements, e.g. the total cost of the individual subsystems is less than the allowable
cost for the subsystem. While this capability may seem trivial, it is valuable on a
larger scale for complex systems that may have thousands of individual components
distributed among dozens of subsystems. The compositional nature of SpeAR allows
designers to pull component-level verification results up to complete subsystem-level
verification, and subsystem-level verification up to complete system-level verification.
Another valuable analysis feature of note in SpeAR is the ability to define units used
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throughout the system and analyze compliance. SpeAR is a new tool that is remains
under development. Outside of this research, SpeAR has only been used to analyze
requirements of an academic coupled tanks system example.[54]
2.4.2 Architecture Analysis with AGREE
The properties and requirements expressed in SpeAR are then used to develop
the system architecture in the Architecture Analysis & Design Language (AADL).
AADL was standardized by SAE in 2004 as an architecture modeling framework to
allow analysis of system designs prior to detailed development.[82] AADL allows for
the inclusion of annexes for additional functionality. The Assume Guarantee Rea-
soning Environment (AGREE) AADL annex[97] was developed by Rockwell Collins
and University of Minnesota as part of the DARPA High Assurance Cyber Military
Systems (HACMS) program to use assume-guarantee contracts to evaluate the behav-
ior of the subsystem components with the greater system. Properties in SpeAR are
documented as guarantees of the system in AGREE, and requirements developed in
SpeAR are used to build the system behavior. Like SpeAR, AGREE utilizes JKIND
and Z3 to conduct model checking and theorem proving to assure that the guarantees
hold. Again, like SpeAR, Z3 outputs proofs or counterexamples that your architec-
ture fulfills the guarantees with the given assumptions. Just as they are in SpeAR,
all of the assumptions and guarantees in AGREE are Boolean expressions that can
be evaluated as true or false. The example requirement in Figure 6 is expressed in
AGREE as shown in Figure 7. In the AGREE annex, the statement in quotation
marks is what is output as proven or falsified in the analysis, but is not actually
analyzed. It is proven if the statement listed below the quoted section is proven to be
true by the model checker. If the guarantee is falsified, a counterexample is produced
showing how the system architecture violated the guarantee.
30
-- R01 The commanded change of angular velocity from the
control algorithm shall not exceed the maximum allowable
angular acceleration of the reaction wheel.
guarantee "r 01a ctrl: RW1 commanded angular acceleration
shall not exceed maximum allowable angular acceleration" :
(psi dot comm 1 <= MAX PSI DOT RW) and (psi dot comm 1 >=
-MAX PSI DOT RW);
Figure 7. AGREE Example
2.4.3 Component Verification with SLDV
Simulink Design Verifier (SLDV) uses formal methods to detect design errors and
requirement violations in a Simulink model. SLDV can also detect integer overflow,
dead logic, array access violations, division by zero with static analysis.[91] The pri-
mary function of interest for this research is SLDV’s ability to detect requirement
violations in the model with formal methods. The assumptions and guarantees devel-
oped during the architecture phase are used to manually write the SLDV verification
functions. The model is analyzed using SLDV to prove that the requirements (doc-
umented as guarantees in AGREE, and as properties and requirements in SpeAR)
hold true throughout the modeling phase. First, the assumptions and requirements
must be stated formally. This step was completed in the requirements design phase
of this research. Just as it was in the requirements and architecture phase, all the
requirements in SLDV are Boolean expressions that can be evaluated as true or false.
The same requirement example from Figure 6 and Figure 7 is carried through into
Figure 8, which shows the requirement specified as a property in SLDV.
%R01 The commanded change of angular velocity from the
control algorithm shall not exceed the maximum allowable
angular acceleration of the reaction wheel.
r 01a ctrl = (psi dot comm 1 <= MAX PSI DOT RW) &&
(psi dot comm 1 >= -MAX PSI DOT RW);
Figure 8. Simulink Design Verifier Example
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2.5 Historic Spacecraft Software Failure Cases Addressable by Formal
Methods
This section describes historical examples of spacecraft failures attributed to dif-
ferent types of software errors that are identifiable by formal methods analysis.[68]
Errors such as divide by zero, overflow, mixed precision, out-of-bounds array access,
unreachable code, requirement conflictions, and unit inconsistency can be caught us-
ing a variety of formal methods tools and techniques.[55]
Figure 9. Mission Specialists Grapple Intelsat During STS-49 [7]
One historical example of a mixed precision spacecraft software failure occurred
on STS-49. During this Space Shuttle mission to rendezvous with and repair the In-
telsat satellite, pictured in Figure 9, the Lambert Targeting Routine used to calculate
rendezvous firings contained a mixed precision error that prevented the routine from
converging and nearly caused the mission to be aborted.[8] While the state vector
variables were double precision, the limits used to bound the calculation were single
precision. The mission was recovered by a workaround that allowed state vector infor-
mation to be relayed from the ground. McAllister stated at the 2014 NASA Formal
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Methods Symposium that later analysis showed formal methods would have found
this error prior to flight.[68]
Figure 10. Ariane 5 Launch [2]
Figure 11. Ariane 5 Explosion [1]
Ariane 5 also had a catastrophic failure that could have been prevented with
the use of formal methods design analysis. The Ariane 5 is a European heavy lift
launch vehicle, pictured in Figure 10, that reused portions of Ariane 4 code on its
first flight, Ariane 501. The software contained a bad 64 to 16 bit conversion which
caused the vehicle trajectory to veer off course and prompted self-destruction of the
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system, pictured in Figure 11.[43] Lacan et al presented research at the 1998 Data
Systems in Aerospace Conference showing how static formal-methods based analysis
tools were successfully applied to formally verify portions of code for Ariane 502 and
the following Ariane flights [63].
Figure 12. An Artist’s Concept Portrays a NASA Mars Exploration Rover on the
Surface of Mars [3]
In 2004, the Mars Exploration Rover, Spirit, pictured in Figure 12, was unexpect-
edly shut down for 10 days after a parameter in the software permitted unlimited
consumption of system memory as flash memory was exhausted. Denny cites this
error as one that could have been caught had formal methods been applied. [43]
Perhaps one of the most famous spacecraft software failures occurred on the Mars
Climate Orbiter (MCO) program, pictured in Figure 13, in which a conflict between
English and metric units in the software resulted in loss of the system. According to
the Mishap Investigation Board Phase I Report [9]:
“The [Mars Climate Orbiter Mishap Investigation Board] has determined
that the root cause for the loss of the MCO spacecraft was the failure to use
metric units in the coding of a ground software file,“Small Forces,” used
in trajectory models. Specifically, thruster performance data in English
units instead of metric units was used in the software application code.”
The requirements for the system specified that the data should be provided in metric
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Figure 13. Artists Rendering of the Mars Climate Orbiter [4]
units. Many modern formal methods tools, such as the Specification and Analysis of
Requirements (SpeAR) tool, provide unit checking capabilities to aid in identification
of errors such as this.
The Mars Polar Lander mission provides an example of conflicting requirements.
One requirement specified that alternative communication methods should be tested
if no commands were received after 24 hours, while another requirement instructed
the system to go into a “sleep mode after 24 hours to conserve battery, making
the alternate communication requirement unreachable. [61] Formal methods tools
can implement model checking to check for inconsistent requirements by evaluating
realizability of a model given the constraining requirements.
The examples listed in this section are just a few of the many examples of software
failure in spacecraft. Application of formal methods could have been used to identify
many of the historical software errors that have appeared in recent decades.[52]
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2.6 Run Time Assurance
RTA is a verification methodology that provides online verification of an “un-
verified controller” design predicated on oﬄine verification of “verified controller”
and “decision module” components, as well as a proposed control architecture, as
described in Section 2.6.2. RTA allows unverified controllers, such as an intelligent
controller, to perform within a predetermined envelope of acceptable behavior. In-
spired by software sandboxing techniques and the simplex architecture, the initial
RTA concept was developed through a series of AFRL Certification of Flight Critical
Systems (CerTA FCS) programs. The objective of the first CerTA FCS program
with prime contractor Northrop Grumman was to identify certification challenges
for unmanned systems. The program concluded with a determination that some
of the certification challenges would require run time verification methods, among
other recommendations.[77] Building on the foundation of the CerTA FCS program,
the CerTA FCS Challenge Problem Integration (CPI) with the Boeing Corporation
as contractor focused on the verification challenge associated with adaptive control
strategies. While the program successfully demonstrated time-delay stability for a
specific L1 adaptive control approach, the technique could not be generalized, and
did not ensure prevention of control surface rate limit failures or aircraft structural
mode excitation caused by the actuators.[74][31] The CerTA FCS CPI effort with
Lockheed Martin, Barron Associates, and Rockwell Collins as contractors developed
an idea they called Run Time Verification and Validation (RTVV) as a cost saving so-
lution to implement advanced systems that are not certifiable by current methods due
to learning, nondeterminism, high criticality, or high complexity.[83] In the follow on
CerTA FCS Challenge Problem Demonstration (CPD) program, Barron Associates
introduced the conceptual ”Run Time Assurance” framework used in this research in
2011. The program developed a simulated RTA autoland system with a predefined
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safety boundary, violation predication, and switching to a reversionary controller
(called the “verified controller” in this research, and referred to as the “safety con-
troller” in the Simplex Architecture). Barron Associates has continued the research
on RTA through a series of Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) grants man-
aged by AFRL. A thorough survey of RTA methodologies was completed by in April
2013 to provide an understanding of the state of the art in RTA development across
a range of contributing technologies.[30]
In contrast to oﬄine verification, RTA provides online constraining of system
performance. RTA controllers feature three distinct characteristics: [30][11]
1. A run time or real-time monitoring and prediction scheme designed to detect
failures not previously identified (software failure) or anticipated (bad environ-
mental design assumptions) before they are about to occur;
2. A failsafe recovery or steering mechanism guaranteed to recover the system in
the event the monitor detects an eminent failure;
3. A structured argument (or assurance case), supported by evidence, justifying
that a system is acceptably safe not only through oﬄine tests, but also through
reliance on real-time monitoring, prediction, and failsafe recovery.[30][11]
The performance of the unverified control system is monitored by a decision mod-
ule that includes a set of acceptable conditions and behaviors. If the system is forced
to operate outside of pre-determined conditions due to an unexpected environmental
change or any of the acceptable behavior ranges are violated, the decision module
switches control from the unverified controller to an appropriate verified backup con-
troller, which could be thought of as the controller’s “Plan B.” The system may have
one or more verified backup controllers capable of tasks such as gracefully transi-
tioning control from the unverified controller function to another verified controller
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function, maintaining a safe system state (i.e. avoiding an obstacle, or performing a
holding pattern), or performing the same tasks expected of advanced controller with
less efficiency. The designed system of verified backup controllers and decision mod-
ules can be analyzed using formal methods to ensure that none of the pre-determined
safety conditions are violated.
2.6.1 Sandboxing and the Simplex Architecture
RTA control architectures are based on concepts from software sandboxing and the
Simplex Architecture. Sandboxing is a technique of isolating sections of code to limit
the sections ability to cause critical system errors and is often used in software and
web-based security testing to isolate untested and untrusted code from active critical
resources.[76] Sandboxing is similar to RTA which isolates the unverified controller
from the rest of the control system. The Simplex Architecture [81] provides protection
to the plant by isolating the complex controller with the addition of a decision module
and safety controller, as depicted in Figure 14. Whenever the complex controller
threatens the safety of the plant, the decision module activates, switching control to
a proven safety controller. The “complex controller” in the Simplex Architecture is
analogous to the RTA “unverified controller” and the “safety controller” corresponds
to the “verified controller.”
Figure 14. The Simplex Architecture
The Simplex Architecture has been successfully applied to systems such as a fleet
of remote-controlled cars [38], a pacemaker [17], a set of advanced aircraft maneuvers
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[80], and an autonomous waypoint tracking system [18]. While sandboxing techniques
and Simplex Architectures are sometimes used only in testing environments, the RTA
architecture is envisioned to be deployed with the operational system to ensure safe
behavior of the system in its environment.
2.6.2 RTA Control Architecture
In the proposed RTA architecture pictured in Figure 15, the system state is sent
to each of the subcomponents: the unverified controller, the verified controller, and
the decision module. The verified and unverified controller each provide actuator
commands to the decision module. The decision module monitors the unverified
controller, and if a safety property is violated, control is switched to the verified
controller. The verified controller has been shown to meet safety properties through
some oﬄine verification method such as formal methods analysis, simulation, and
flight test. The RTA control architecture is not limited to one verified safety or
recovery controller. An RTA controller implementation might be devised such that
it has multiple recovery controllers and switches to the appropriate one based on the
state of the system.
Figure 15. The Run Time Assurance Architecture
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2.6.3 Auto GCAS as an Example RTA with Complex Switching Logic
The decision module is not limited to switching only when a specific safety prop-
erty is violated either; the decision to switch could be made on a much more complex
set of criteria. For example, the F-16 Automatic Ground Collision Avoidance System
(Auto GCAS), developed by AFRL and Lockheed Martin,[89] could be considered
an RTA control system if one examines its core functionality. Auto GCAS depends
on the pilot to be the primary controller of the aircraft. In the RTA control archi-
tecture analogy, the pilot could be thought of as the “unverified controller” because
he or she is subject to situations such as gravity-induced loss of consciousness, target
fixation, task saturation, or loss of situational awareness that may compromise his
or her ability to control the aircraft. Continuing with the RTA control architecture
analogy, the prescripted automatic recovery maneuver Auto GCAS uses to avoid ter-
rain would be considered the “verified controller.” This automatic maneuver rolls the
aircraft to wings level and pulls up to 5 g’s (5 times the force of gravity) to avoid
colliding with the terrain. The Auto GCAS algorithm serves as the “decision module”
in the RTA control architecture analogy with the responsibility to monitor the path
of the aircraft, switch control to an automatic recovery controller when a collision
is imminent, and switch control back to the pilot when the aircraft has cleared the
terrain. The Auto GCAS “decision module,” uses a complex algorithm that compares
a projection of the automatic recovery maneuver to a two dimensional projection of
the terrain with buffers ahead of the aircraft to determine if a ground collision is
imminent. When the projection of the recovery maneuver intersects the projection of
the terrain with safety buffers as show in Figure 16, the Auto GCAS “decision mod-
ule” switches control from the pilot (unverified controller) to the automatic recovery
maneuver (verified controller). Once the terrain is cleared, the Auto GCAS “decision
module” switches control from the automatic recovery maneuver back to the pilot.
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Figure 16. The Auto GCAS Automatic Maneuver and Terrain Projection Comparison
This example simplifies the Auto GCAS functionality, but illustrates an alternative
implementation of an RTA control architecture than the case study presented in this
thesis.
2.7 Space Filling Experimental Design Simulations (SFEDS)
Conducting batch simulations that cover a wide swath of the design space ex-
pands the analysis of a single simulation case to enable more comprehensive analysis.
However, conducting simulations of every possible input may be extremely compu-
tationally expensive and infeasible. While the simulated equations of motion and
controller used in this research are deterministic (given the same set of inputs, they
will produce the same result every time), the possible initial and final spacecraft orien-
tations that the system could encounter are non-deterministic, situational-dependent
values. The initial orientation could be the result of a previous command, random
perturbations on the satellite, or a number of other variables. The final orientation
could be a vector corresponding to aspects of the mission, such as an orientation
that places a sensor in a specific direction or the solar panels in a position to absorb
maximum sunlight, that are subject to change and reprioritization. In addition, the
nonlinear nature of the system makes it difficult to predict which initial and final
pointing angles of the satellite could lead to violations of the requirements. Using
SFEDS allows for a section of the design space to be explored in a manageable set of
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100s to 10,000s of simulations.
SFEDS is similar to Monte Carlo simulation. According to the Palisade Corpora-
tion, “Monte Carlo simulation performs risk analysis by building models of possible
results by substituting a range of values for any factor that has inherent uncertainty”
and using latin hypercube (LH) sampling rather than a random sampling can pro-
duce a more accurate set of results from the entire range of possible values.[36] The
uncertain factors in the SFEDS conducted in this research are the initial and final
orientation of the spacecraft, and the risk of interest is that the requirements of the
control system are violated. Wolfram Research Inc. defines Monte Carlo methods
as “any method which solves a problem by generating suitable random numbers and
observing that fraction of the number obeying some property or properties.”[95] In
this research, the suitable “random” numbers generated correspond to descriptions of
the initial and final orientation of the satellite and the properties of interest are the
requirements of the controller. In this context SFEDS may be used to evaluate what
fraction of possible initial and final pointing angle conditions result in a violation of
the requirements during a maneuver with a nonlinear PID controller. What separates
the SFEDS in this research from Monte Carlo simulation is that the system studied
in this research is deterministic and system variables are not being modified during
the simulation. SFEDS are better suited for identifying unknown response surfaces
where complex forms and localized effects are possible.[70]
An SFEDS may be conducted to determine if there is a relationship between
the explanatory variables, also known as independent variables, and the response
variables, also known as dependent variables. The number of explanatory variables in
the simulation is referred to as the number of factors and the relationship between the
explanatory and response variables is referred to as a response surface.[20] There are a
variety of methods used to generate a matrix of explanatory variables for an SFEDS;
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however, LH designs, first proposed in 1979,[69] have become the predominant design
choice for computer simulation experiments.[26] When all of the input variables of an
LH have zero correlation, it is referred to as an orthogonal LH (OLH).[59] Hernandez
defines a nearly OLH (NOLH) as an LH in which no two variables have a correlation
of more than 0.05.[58] One of the advantages of the NOLH experiment designs is
that they enable identification of non-linear relationships between the explanatory, or
independent variables, and response, or dependent variables.[23] For this research the
space-filling design of NOLH was selected to provide an exploration of the response
surface.
The response surface generated by the SFEDS may be characterized by a variety of
methods, including graphically or statistically using software such as JMP Statistical
Discovery Software from SAS. JMP can be used to generate a statistical model of
the response curve with a coefficient of determination R2 value that indicates how
well the statistical data fits the model generated. An R2 value of 1 indicates that the
model fits the data perfectly while an R2 value of 0 indicates that data doesnt fit the
model at all.
2.8 Summary
Chapter II began by providing background on cyber-physical systems theory as
it relates to modern control theory, before describing characteristics of good require-
ments, requirement types, and requirement verification. The foundational theories
and techniques behind FMA were presented and the tools used to conduct FMA of
the requirements, architecture, and model of the nonlinear control system were de-
scribed. Additional analysis techniques including SFEDS were introduced. The topics
of Chapter II provide context and background information on the analysis techniques
used in this research.
43
III. CubeSats and Spacecraft Attitude Dynamics and
Control
Chapter III provies background in CubeSats, reference frames, and spacecraft
attitude dynamics and control.
3.1 6U CubeSat Application
The AFIT 6U CubeSat ACS is used as a challenge problem for non-traditional
verification techniques including formal methods, run time assurance, and reachability
analysis. This section provides background on CubeSats, the AFIT 6U CubeSat,
reaction wheel dynamics, magnetic torque coil actuation, the equations of motion for
the system, and a set of hypothetical requirements for a spacecraft attitude control
subsystem.
3.1.1 CubeSats
CubeSats are small satellites built in units, or “U,” which are nominally 10 x 10
x 10 cm3, or 1 liter, in volume and have a mass of 1.3 kilograms (3 pounds) or less.
CubeSats initially began as a set of amateur radio experiments in the 1970s - 1980s,
matured as university experiments in the 1990s - 2000s, and began being utilized
for technology experiments and to carry out real missions in the 2010s.[78] More
recently, CubeSats have been considered for increasingly complex missions including
interplanetary and lunar missions such as NASA’s Lunar Flashlight mission, which
seeks to determine presence or absence of exposed water ice on our Moon’s south
pole.[35] Complex missions can have precise pointing requirements, depending on
the requirements of the satellite payload. While attitude control actuators exist for
small 1-3U CubeSat designs, larger actuators and accompanying control algorithms
are needed to provide greater control authority over larger 6-27U CubeSat designs.
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3.1.2 CubeSats for DoD Missions
CubeSats are generally much less expensive to design, test, transport and launch
than larger traditional satellites and therefore present a potential time and cost effec-
tive approach to meet DoD project needs.[96] However, the limited size and weight
of smaller CubeSats provide relatively little space for mission-specific payloads and
the advanced subsystems required to support them. To meet the increasing needs
associated with anticipated DoD missions, AFIT’s Center for Space Research and
Assurance (CSRA) is currently developing 6, 12, and 27U CubeSats which promise a
larger payload to bus ratio than the traditional 1U and 3U versions.[87]
3.1.3 AFIT 6U CubeSat Testbed
AFIT’s 6U CubeSat Attitude Determination and Control System (ADCS) Testbed
is part of a engineering development unit (EDU) for classroom use only that is in-
crementally built by students in a master’s level course called ASYS 632 Satellite
Design and Test.[12] The approximate mass of the CubeSat bus and chassis with-
out cross braces has a mass of approximately 4 kg, and a volume of approximately
2000 cm3, leaving approximately 8 kg of mass and 5000 cm3 of volume for additional
subsystems and payload. The complete Attitude Determination System (ADS) of
the EDU may contain up to six sun sensors, one or two Earth sensors, one or two
star sensors, two magnetometers, and an IMU. The complete ACS may contain a
reaction wheel array (RWA) and three magnetic torque coils (MTC). The complete
ACS software is envisioned to have multiple control modes including a sun-soak mode
that orients the solar cells for maximum power generation, an alignment mode that
orients the spacecraft body vector with an inertial vector, and an alignment mode
that orients a spacecraft body vector with a nadir vector. The attitude control al-
gorithm is assumed to be a PID controller. The 2015 ADCS Testbed, as pictured in
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Figure 17, includes the following components and subsystems: ADCS board, motor
control board, RWA, electrical power system(EPS) board, battery pack, command
data and handling (CDH) board with WiFly capability, and a laser pointer.
Figure 17. AFIT 6U ADCS Testbed[92]
3.1.4 AFIT Four Wheel Reaction Wheel Array
The AFIT RWA implemented on the ADCS test bed includes four wheels in a
pyramid configuration that provides redundancy if a failure were to occur in one of
the wheels. The AFIT CubeSat four wheel RWA is shown in Figure 18.
Figure 18. AFIT’s CubeSat Four Wheel Pyramid Reaction Wheel Assembly[40]
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The RWA is not flight qualified because it cannot survive expected launch vehicle
vibration loads; however, its low friction and redundancy make it an excellent system
for the laboratory. A CAD Model of just the RWA and its frame without the elec-
tronics stack is shown in Figure 19. The numbering scheme and coordinate system
that describe orientation of the individual reaction wheels with respect to the RWA
assembly is shown in Figure 20.
Figure 19. CAD Model of AFIT Four Wheel RWA
Figure 20. Four Wheel Pyramid Reaction Wheel Array Coordinate System[92]
The angle between the reaction wheel angular momentum vector and the x-axis,
represented as α, for wheels 1, 2, 3, and 4 is 315, 45, 135, and 225 degrees, respectively.
The angle between the reaction wheel angular momentum vector and the z-axis,
represented as β, is 45 degrees.
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3.2 Spacecraft Attitude Dynamics and Control
The purpose of an ACS is to control the orientation of the spacecraft relative to
other objects. Examples include the need to point an onboard sensor or communica-
tion antenna at a specific place on the Earth, or to orient the spacecraft solar panels
orthogonal to the vector from the satellite to the sun for maximum power generation.
In this section, the kinematics and kinetics of spacecraft attitude are discussed, ex-
ample control actuators are described, a PID control algorithm is presented, and the
equations of motion for spacecraft attitude control are derived.
3.2.1 Kinematics
Kinematics provide a mathematical description of the relationship between space-
craft orientation and angular velocity. A variety of spacecraft orientation representa-
tions and a select set of spacecraft attitude kinematic equations are presented in this
section.
3.2.1.1 Rotation Matrices
A rotation matrix, also known as a Direction Cosine Matrix, is one way to convert
vectors from one coordinate frame to another. In spacecraft attitude dynamics, a
vector in the spacecraft body frame ~vb may be found from a vector in the spacecraft
inertial frame ~vi, as using a rotation matrix R
bi as
~vb = R
bi~vi. (1)
The entries of the rotation matrix are dot products of the vertices.[86] It can
be shown that the inverse of a rotation matrix is equivalent to the transpose of the
rotation matrix (R−1 = RT ).[86] Thus rotation matrices are orthonormal, meaning
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that each column has a magnitude of 1 (||ˆi1|| = ||ˆi2|| = ||ˆi3|| = 1) and all the columns
are mutually independent (ˆi1 · iˆ2 = iˆ1 · iˆ3 = iˆ2 · iˆ3 = 0). The rotation matrix can be
written as a concatenation of 3×1 column matrices corresponding to one frame’s unit
vectors and another frame’s components.[84] The rotation matrix notation, equation,
matrix of components, and a concatenation of 3×1 column matrices may be expressed
as
Rbi = bˆ · iˆT =

bˆ1 · iˆ1 bˆ1 · iˆ2 bˆ1 · iˆ3
bˆ2 · iˆ1 bˆ2 · iˆ2 bˆ2 · iˆ3
bˆ3 · iˆ1 bˆ3 · iˆ2 bˆ3 · iˆ3
 =
[[ˆ
i1
]
b
[ˆ
i2
]
b
[ˆ
i3
]
b
]
. (2)
Because a general rotation has three degrees of freedom and a rotation matrix
contains 9 components, there are 6 constraints corresponding to its orthonormal prop-
erties (||ˆi1|| = ||ˆi2|| = ||ˆi3|| = 1 and iˆ1 · iˆ2 = iˆ1 · iˆ3 = iˆ2 · iˆ3 = 0).[84]
3.2.1.2 Euler Angles
Rotation matrices form the bases of Euler angles, which describe 3 successive sim-
ple rotations about individual axes. Leonhard Euler first suggested using a sequence
of rotations to convert an orientation in an orbital frame to an inertial frame in the
18th century. It can be shown that three independent parameters are the minimum
required to fully describe any rotation.[84] The order in which the rotation matrices
are multiplied is key, and the first rotation must be on the right most side of the
triple product. An example of a 3-2-1 sequence is shown here as
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R3−2−1 = R1(θ3)R2(θ2)R3(θ1)
=

1 0 0
0 cos(θ3) sin(θ3)
0 −sin(θ3 cos(θ3)


cos(θ2) 0 −sin(θ2)
0 1 0
sin(θ2) 0 cos(θ2)


cos(θ1) sin(θ1) 0
−sin(θ1) cos(θ1) 0
0 0 1
 .
(3)
There are several disadvantages to using Euler angle representations. First, Euler
angle representations are subject to singularities when the second angle is equal to
0, 90, 180, 270, or 360 degrees (0, pi/2, pi, 3pi/2, or 2pi radians) depending on the se-
quence. These singularities are of particular concern for spacecraft, which experience
large angle motion and may be tumbling and frequently entering attitudes where the
singularities are present. Second, trigonometric functions have a high computation
cost which could tax space-hardened processors that are several generations behind
modern processors, although spacecraft processing power is improving and the com-
putational cost of trigonometric functions is becoming less important.[84]
3.2.1.3 Euler Axis Rotation
Euler axis rotations, also known as eigenaxis rotations, represent rotations as a
single rotation about a fixed Euler axis (aˆ), and a principal Euler angle of rotation
(Φ). For pure rotations where the Euler axis passes through the origin,[84] the motion
can be described by a rotation matrix that satisfies
Rbiaˆ = aˆ. (4)
The Euler axis is the eigenvector of the rotation matrix associated with an eigen-
value of 1. The Euler axis and principle Euler angle representation contains four
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parameters but only three are independent with a constraint that the product of
transpose of the Euler axis with the Euler axis must equal 1 (aˆT aˆ = 1). The Euler
axis and principle Euler angle [84] may be computed from
Φ = cos−1
[1
2
(trace(R)− 1)
]
. (5)
aˆ× =
1
2sin(Φ)
(RT −R) (6)
where aˆ× is a skew-symmetric matrix comprised of components of aˆ. The Euler axis
and Euler angle representation is still subject to a singularity when the sine of the
principle Euler angle is equal to 0 or 2pi (sin(Φ) = 0 or 2pi).[84]
3.2.1.4 Quaternions
A quaternion, also known as a Euler parameter set, is a four-parameter array (q¯)
with a unit norm constraint and is comprised of vector component ~q123 and a scalar
component q4. The quaternions may be calculated from the Euler axis and principle
Euler angle using
~q123 = aˆsin
(Φ
2
)
(7)
and
q4 = cos
(Φ
2
)
. (8)
A rotation matrix can be generated from
R = (q24 − (~q123)T~q123)U 3×3 + 2~q123(~q123)T − 2q4(~q123)× (9)
where U 3×3 is a 3×3 identity matrix, and (~q123)× is a skew-symmetric matrix with
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components of ~q123. The quaternion can be generated from a rotation matrix with
q4 = ±0.5
√
1 + trace(R) (10)
and
~q123 =
1
4q4

R23 −R32
R31 −R13
R12 −R21
 . (11)
3.2.1.5 Quaternion Kinematics
The time rate of change of a quaternion ˙¯q is a function of the current quaternion
and the spacecraft angular velocity vector ~ω, and may be calculated from
˙¯q =

q˙1
q˙2
q˙3
q˙4

=
1
2
Q4×3~ω =
1
2

q4 −q3 q2
q3 q4 −q1
−q2 q1 q4
−q1 −q2 −q3


ω1
ω2
ω3
 (12)
One of the primary advantages of quaternions is that quaternion differential or kine-
matic equations do not contain any singularities.
3.2.2 Kinetics
Kinetics describe the relationship between torque, angular velocity, and angular
acceleration. The angular momentum of the spacecraft ~hsc is given by
~hsc = I~ω (13)
where I is the mass moment of inertia (MOI) matrix of the spacecraft. The MOI
matrix contains scalar moments of inertia on the diagonal, and products of inertial
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on the off diagonal. When the body frame axes are aligned with the principal axes,
the MOI matrix of the body of the spacecraft can be diagonalized, so that the MOI of
the spacecraft can be entirely described by scalar moments of inertia on the diagonal,
in the form
I =

Ixx 0 0
0 Iyy 0
0 0 Izz
 . (14)
Spacecraft experience two types of torque: internal and external. Internal torque
usually comes from actuators such as reaction wheels, momentum bias wheels, and
control moment gyros, while external torque could be applied from orbital perturba-
tions, aerodynamic drag or control actuators such as thrusters, magnetic torque rods,
magnetic torque coils, or solar or aerodynamic torque actuators. In the absence of
external torques, the total angular momentum ~Htot of the spacecraft is a sum of the
angular momentums of the spacecraft ~hsc and any internal torque actuators ~hinternal,
given by
~Htot = ~hsc + ~hinternal. (15)
When external torques are present, the relationship between the external moments
~M and the time rate of change of angular momentum ~˙H must be computed in an
inertial frame,[57] as described in the Euler’s equation by
~M = ~˙H =
d(i)
dt
( ~H). (16)
The transport theorem [85] may be used to write Euler’s equation in a body-fixed
frame, as
~M = ~˙H = ~˙hsc + ~ω
×~hsc + ~˙hrwa + ~ω×~hrwa = I~ω + ~ω×I~ω + ~˙hrwa + ~ω×~hrwa (17)
53
where ~ω× is the skew-symmetric matrix of spacecraft angular rates.
3.2.3 Reaction Wheel Actuation
Reaction wheels are common actuators used for precision spacecraft attitude con-
trol that work by exchanging momentum with the spacecraft. By contrast, actuators
such as thrusters or magnetic torque devices interact with the environment to apply
an external torque to the spacecraft, which changes the spacecraft total angular mo-
mentum ~Htot. In the absence of external torques, the total angular momentum of the
spacecraft remains constant, and the total angular momentum of the RWA is equal
and opposite to the angular momentum that it exchanges with the spacecraft. One
disadvantage of RWAs is their vulnerability to a phenomenon known as saturation,
which occurs once the maximum angular velocity rates one or more reaction wheels
are reached and the RWA is no longer able to control the spacecraft attitude in certain
directions. RWAs are one of the most precise attitude actuators with accuracy of up
to 0.001 degree [64] in some cases, and are less complex than actuators such as control
moment gyros, but they are one of the heavier actuator options available.[96][22][51]
3.2.3.1 Individual Reaction Wheel Dynamics
The individual reaction wheel’s angular momentum ~hrw is
~hrw = D~ψi (18)
where D is the wheel’s mass moment of inertia, ~ψi is the rate of spin about the axis
of the spin of reaction wheel i.
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3.2.3.2 3-Wheel Reaction Wheel Array Dynamics
When the RWA has three wheels, each identical and aligned with the body axes
of the spacecraft, the angular momentum of the RWA ~hrwa can be written as
~hrwa = ~hrw1 + ~hrw2 + ~hrw3 = D

ψ1
ψ2
ψ3
 . (19)
3.2.3.3 4-Wheel Pyramid Reaction Wheel Array Dynamics
In the case of a 4-wheel pyramid RWA, like that simulated in this research, a 4×3
torque mapping matrix is needed to transform the torque vector of each wheel to the
body frame. The angular momentum of the RWA ~hrwa is given by:
~hrwa = S ~ψ (20)
where ~ψ is an array containing the angular velocity of each of the reaction wheels,
and S is a matrix that orients the angular momentum contribution of each reaction
wheels with the body axes of the spacecraft. The S matrix is defined as:
S = D

cos(α1) sin(β) cos(α2) sin(β) cos(α3) sin(β) cos(α4) sin(β)
sin(α1) sin(β) sin(α2) sin(β) sin(α3) sin(β) sin(α4) sin(β)
cos(β) cos(β) cos(β) cos(β)
 (21)
where α is the angle between a particular reaction wheel’s angular momentum vector
and the spacecraft’s x-axis and β is the angle between the reaction wheel angular
momentum vector and the z-axis.
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3.2.3.4 Momentum Exchange
As discussed earlier, RWAs are momentum exchange actuators that work by ex-
changing momentum with the spacecraft while not changing the total angular mo-
mentum of the spacecraft. The total angular momentum of the spacecraft with RWA
actuation is given by
~Htot = ~hsc + ~hrwa. (22)
3.2.4 PID Spacecraft Attitude Control
The first step in the control process is determining the difference between the
present and desired orientation. This difference is represented by quaternion error q¯e
and is computed from
q¯e =

q4c −q3c q2c q1c
q3c q4c −q1c q2c
−q2c q1c q4c q3c
−q1c −q2c −q3c q4c

q¯p (23)
where qic terms are the commanded quaternions, and ~qp is the present quaternion
array. The controller used in this work is a PID controller introduced by Wie [98] in
which the calculated change in angular momentum of the RWA ~˙hrwa is from
~˙hrwa = KP I~qe123 + KDI~ω + KI11∆t(qe1 + qe2 + qe3)− ~ω×(I~ω + ~hrwa) (24)
where KP , KI , and KD are the proportional, integral, and derivative gains of the
controller, ~qe123 is a vector part of the error quaternion, I is the spacecraft 3×3
matrix mass moment of inertia, ~ω is the spacecraft angular velocity vector, ∆t is
the time step of the simulation, ~ω× is a skew-symmetric matrix with off-diagonal
components comprised of the angular velocity vector elements, and ~hrwa is the RWA
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angular momentum. The gains of this controller are calculated from
KP = I
(
ω2n +
2ζωn
T
)
, (25)
KI = I
(
ω2n
T
)
, (26)
KD = I
(
2ζωn +
1
T
)
, (27)
and
T =
10
ζωn
. (28)
The resulting reaction wheel commanded angular acceleration ~˙ψcom is calculated
from
~˙ψcom = S
+~˙hrwa (29)
where S+ is the pseudoinverse of the S matrix that orients the angular momentum
contribution of each reaction wheels with the body axes of the spacecraft. Rate
limits are placed on each of the wheels that limit the maximum acceleration angu-
lar acceleration and angular velocity of the wheels that can be produced from the
commanded acceleration given the current angular velocity of the reaction wheels.
Integrator windup from the PID controller is abstracted out of this research and
could be explored in future work.
3.2.5 Equations of Motion
In this section, the state derivative equations of motion for a system with RWA
are presented.
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The state vector x¯ is defined here as
x¯ =
[
q¯ ~ω ~ψ
]T
=
[
q1, q2, q3, q4, ω1, ω2, ω3, ψ1, ψ2, ψ3, ψ4
]T
(30)
where the qi terms are the elements of the quaternion describing the orientation, the
ω terms are the spacecraft angular velocity about each principal axis, and the ψ terms
are the angular velocity of each of the reaction wheels. The time rate of change of
the state can then be expressed as: [88][60]
˙¯x =

04×4 0.5Q4×3 04×4
03×4 −I−1ω×I −I−1ω×S
04×4 04×3 04×4
 x¯−

04×4
I−1
04×3
S ~˙ψ +

04×4
I−1
04×3
 ~M +

04×4
03×4
U 4×4
 ~˙ψ (31)
where ~M is a vector of external torques acting on the spacecraft body axes, U 4×4 is
a 4×4 identity matrix, 0n×m is a n×m matrix of zeros, and Q4×3 is
Q4×3 =

q4 −q3 q2
q3 q4 −q1
−q2 q1 q4
−q1 −q2 −q3

. (32)
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IV. Methodology
Chapter IV begins by describing the verification strategy to show requirement
satisfaction for the PID and RTA controller designs. Next, a set of hypothetical re-
quirements are presented and then formally described for the 6U CubeSat attitude
control subsystem. The strategy used to provide traceability of the requirements
is described. Next, development and application of FMA techniques to the derived
requirements, architecture, and model are described. Finally, techniques from tra-
ditional verification techniques, such as mathematical feasibility analysis (FA), SIM,
and SFEDS, are presented. Between FMA, SIM, SFEDS, and FA requirement satis-
faction may be shown for all requirements except those dealing with reachability.
4.1 Verification Strategy
In this section, a hypothetical set of CubeSat ACS requirements are presented,
and the verification and traceability strategies used to show requirement satisfaction
in each design phase are introduced.
4.1.1 Requirements Set
Hypothetical requirements are presented here for the 6U CubeSat highlighting
the limitation of the actuators, the pointing accuracy of the control system, slewing
range and rate, drift, settling time, rise time, and percent overshoot. The Defense Ac-
quisition University (DAU) defines derived requirements as requirements that “arise
from constraints, consideration of issues implied but not explicitly stated in the re-
quirements baseline, factors introduced by the selected architecture, cyber security
requirements and the design. Derived requirements are definitized through require-
ments analysis as part of the overall systems engineering process (SEP) and are part
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of the allocated baseline.”[93] The first two requirements in the set presented here
are derived requirements that arise once a RWA is selected to actuate the satellite.
Requirements R01 and R02 constrain the output of the control algorithm to prevent
damage to the reaction wheel motors:
• R01 The commanded time rate of change of angular velocity shall not exceed
the maximum allowable angular acceleration of the reaction wheel.
• R02 The commanded angular velocity shall not exceed the maximum allowable
angular velocity of the reaction wheel.
The remaining requirements describe the expected performance of the attitude
control subsystem in the context of its ability to control the 6U CubeSat attitude:
• R03 The pointing accuracy shall be at least 1 degree as a threshold and 0.08
degrees as an objective.
• R04 The pointing range about the z axis shall be 0 to 360 degrees.
• R05 The pointing range about the y axis shall be 0 to 360 degrees.
• R06 The pointing range about the x axis shall be 0 to 360 degrees.
• R07 The maximum slew rate shall be > 3 deg/sec as a threshold and > 7 deg/sec
as an objective.
• R08 After settling, the drift rate shall be < 3 deg/min as a threshold and < 1
deg/min as an objective.
• R09 After settling, the total drift shall be ≤ 0.5 degrees as a threshold and ≤
0.1 degrees as an objective.
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• R10 The 5% settling time shall be ≤ 5 minutes as a threshold and ≤ 2 minutes
as an objective.
• R11 The 2% settling time shall be ≤ 7 minutes as a threshold and ≤ 3 minutes
as an objective.
• R12 The rise time shall be ≤ 5 minutes as a threshold and ≤ 2 minutes as an
objective.
• R13 The percent overshoot shall be ≤ 50% as a threshold and ≤ 25% as an
objective.
4.1.2 Requirement Analysis Stragety
Not all analysis techniques are appropriate for different types of requirements.
For example, FMA is currently limited to analysis of linear systems with very little
capability to analyze nonlinear systems. For this reason, FMA is best suited to
showing satisfaction of the first two requirements, which are derived requirements that
describe the rate limiting of the control actuators. Application of SFEDS provides
insight, though not proof, into the satisfaction of the remaining requirements. The
techniques applied to each of the requirements are summarized in Table 3.
The * on the SFEDS for requirements R04, R05, and R06 SFEDS indicates that
these requirements are not analyzed in the main SFEDS. A seperate SFEDS for
requirements R04, R05, and R06 analysis consists of batch simulations from an initial
state of 0 degrees about each axis to final states from 0 to 360 degrees about the x,
y, and z-axes, one at a time for a total of 1080 simulations.
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Table 3. Strategy for Requirements Analysis
Req’t FA FMA SIM SFEDS
R01 × × ×
R02 × × ×
R03 × ×
R04 ×*
R05 ×*
R06 ×*
R07 × × ×
R08 × ×
R09 × ×
R10 × ×
R11 × ×
R12 × ×
R13 × ×
4.1.3 Traceability of Requirements and Assumptions
Requirements traceability from the requirements, through the architecture, and
into the modeling phase is achieved by a strict naming convention developed for this
research. This naming convention was first introduced in Section 2.4.1. Each assump-
tion and requirement is first assigned an a for assumption or an r for requirement.
Next, the assumption or requirement is numbered with two digits, although with
more than 99 assumptions or requirements, this number could be modified to include
three or more digits. Next, if the requirement applies to more than one component, it
is broken down for each component and assigned a unique letter to follow the require-
ment number (a, b, c, etc). Finally, a four letter description of the component that
the requirement applies to is appended to the end, such as ctrl for controller. The
initial letters, numbers, and descriptions of each requirement or assumption are sepa-
rated by an underscore. For example, the first wheel sub requirement is documented
as r 01a ctrl, where r indicates that it is a requirement versus an assumption, 01
is the number of the requirement, a is the first sub requirement (it applies to wheel
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1), and ctrl denotes that it is a controller component requirement.
4.2 Requirements Development and Formalization
In this section, a formal representation of each of the 13 hypothetical ACS require-
ments is discussed and values assigned to the formal requirements are presented.
4.2.1 Formal Representation of the Requirements
In order to analyze a requirement with a formal method, such as model check-
ing, the requirement must be expressed a precise mathematical syntax, such as that
provided by a temporal logic based language. The formal methods tools used in this
research implement a scope and predicate pairing. The scope provides a temporal
or conditional description of when the requirement should hold true. The predicate
defines the condition of interest that should hold true within the defined scope.
For the following requirement definitions, it is assumed that only one maneuver
is conducted, and the total scope of all of the requirements is the total time of the
simulation. If however, it would be desired to analyze these requirements over multiple
maneuvers in succession, the scope of all the requirements would be the time of a single
maneuver which would restart when each new maneuver is commanded. The scope,
and analysis of the requirements within that scope, would reset as soon as the next
commanded orientation was received.
4.2.1.1 R01 and R02: Reaction Wheel Angular Acceleration and
Velocity Limitation
Requirements R01 and R02 are examples of invariant properties because they are
satisfied by showing that no reachable states of the system violate the requirement.
For requirements R01 and R02, the scope is “always,” because there is never a situa-
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tion in which the reaction wheels should exceed the maximum acceleration or velocity.
The predicate for R01 is that the acceleration commanded by the controller should
never exceed the maximum acceleration for each reaction wheel (|ψ˙com| ≤ ψ˙max), and
the predicate for R02 is that the velocity resulting from the acceleration commanded
by the controller should never exceed the maximum velocity for each reaction wheel
(|ψpre + ψ˙com∆t| ≤ ψmax).
4.2.1.2 R03: Pointing Accuracy
A pointing accuracy requirement is another example of an invariant property be-
cause it is satisfied by showing that within the scope, no reachable states of the
system violate the requirement. The scope of the pointing error requirement is after
the system has settled (t ≥ Ts). When the system has settled can be determined in a
variety of ways including the time after the 5% or 2% settling time requirement has
been met. For this research, settled is defined by a spacecraft angular acceleration
and angular velocity range, where the angular acceleration must be less than approx-
imately 0.01 degrees per second squared or 2.9089×10−6 radians per second squared
(||~˙ω|| ≤ 2.9089×10−6) and the spacecraft angular velocity must be less than 1 degree
per minute or approximately 2.9089×10−4 radians per second (||~ω|| ≤ 2.9089×10−4).
The first step in mathematically stating a pointing accuracy predicate is defining the
pointing error.
The pointing error is derived from the definition of the quaternion which contains
a 3x1 vector component ~q123 and a scalar component q4 which is calculated from
q(4) = cos
(Φ
2
)
(33)
where Φ is the Euler angle. Eqn. 33 can be rearranged to calculate the Euler angle
Φ from the quaternion with
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Φ = 2acos(q4), (34)
which is desirable if the model uses quaternions to update the orientation state,
like the model used in this research. The pointing error ep may be calculated by
subtracting the final Euler angle Φf from the current Euler angle Φ, written here as
ep = Φ− Φf . (35)
The predicate for pointing accuracy states that the pointing error ep must not exceed
the pointing requirement er (ep ≤ er).
4.2.1.3 R04-R06: Reachability
Requirements R04, R05, and R06 essentially deal with reachability. For a linear
system, all states could be said to be reachable if the system is completely controllable.
This can be determined by calculating the rank of the controllability matrix. If the
rank of the controllability matrix Mc, defined as
Mc = [B,AB, ..., A
n-1B]n×(nl−l2+1), (36)
is n for a system with l inputs, then the system is completely controllable. For
nonlinear systems, determining controllability is a non-trivial task. However, tools
such as Flow* [27] have emerged in the last few years to aid in calculation of reachable
states for nonlinear systems. In this research, insight is gained into whether the
system is completely controllable by determining if the pointing error at the end of the
simulated maneuver ep(tf ) is less than a pointing error requirement er (ep(tf ) ≤ er).
In simulation, the scope of this maneuver is the final time (t =tf ). In a simulation
with no noise, like those conducted in this research, the final pointing error at the
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end of the simulation should be zero.
4.2.1.4 R07: Maximum Slew Rate
A maximum slew rate requirement is an example of a liveness property because it
is met if at least one reachable state satisfies the requirement. In simulation, the slew
rate requirement is satisfied if it is eventually reached. The slew rate is the magnitude
of the spacecraft’s instantaneous angular velocity during a slewing maneuver. The
scope of the slew rate would be from the start of the maneuver until the spacecraft
is settled (t ≤Ts). To formally prove that a slew rate requirement is met, it must
be proven that at some point during a slewing maneuver from one position at rest
to another position at rest the angular velocity of the spacecraft will exceed the
minimum slew rate stated in the requirement. A formal verification method such as
model checking is not a good verification method for a slew rate requirement because
there are many maneuvers in which it would be desirable for the angular velocity of
the spacecraft not to exceed the slew rate. For instance if the spacecraft is required
to change the pointing angle by one degree, reaching the slew rate specified by the
requirement during the maneuver would overshoot the desired angle and take longer
to settle.
The true concern being expressed in a maximum slew rate requirement is whether
the actuator selected is appropriately sized to be responsive to reorientation com-
mands. Therefore, the best ways to show satisfaction of a slew rate requirement are
to show it is mathematically possible to achieve the desired slew rate, or to demon-
strate a case in which the spacecraft angular velocity appropriately exceeds the slew
rate requirement, or to analyze the maximum slew rate for a range of initial and final
conditions in a SFEDS. For a RWA attitude actuator, it can be shown that a desired
slew rate is possible by analyzing the maximum angular momentum the RWA can
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generate. RWAs actuate the satellite through momentum exchange, where the change
in angular momentum of the RWA is equal and opposite to the change in angular
momentum of the spacecraft. The maximum angular momentum that the reaction
wheels can generate would occur when the reaction wheels start at their maximum
velocity in one direction and accelerate to their maximum velocity in the opposite
direction.
Given a selected RWA design, the RWA and spacecraft angular momentum equa-
tions can be set equal to one another rearranged to solve for maximum achievable
spacecraft angular velocity ~ωmax from rest using
~ωmax = I
-1S ~ψmax. (37)
Satisfaction of the slew rate requirement is shown by comparing the maximum
achievable spacecraft angular velocity to the required slew rate ωr to show that the
maximum velocity from rest eventually meets or exceeds that required (||~ωmax|| ≥ ωr).
4.2.1.5 R08 and R09: Drift Rate and Total Drift
Requirements R08 and R09 are additional examples of invariant properties because
they are satisfied by showing that within scope, no reachable states of the system
violate the requirement. Drift rate is a measure of how quickly a system deviates from
the commanded orientation once the commanded orientation has been achieved and
total drift is the amount the spacecraft orientation has deviated from the commanded
orientation. Like the pointing accuracy requirement, the scope of drift rate and total
drift requirements is the time after the spacecraft has settled (t ≥ Ts). The drift
rate is the angular velocity after the spacecraft has settled, and the total drift is the
pointing error after the spacecraft has settled.
Drift rate and total drift are concerns in cyber-physical systems where measure-
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ment errors in physical sensors and true continuous dynamics make constantly main-
taining an exact desired position impossible with a discrete control algorithm. At-
tempting to maintain the position exactly may result in a series of very abrupt ma-
neuvers that create high frequency noise as the satellite constantly attempts to jerk
right back to the correct position. Rather than maintaining an exact orientation, a
deadband is defined so that no action will take place within a certain range of the cor-
rect position. Small drift rates and amounts of drift should not impact the mission as
long as they remain within the drift rate ωdr and total drift etdr requirements; there-
fore, the predicate for the drift rate requirement states that the spacecraft angular
velocity should not exceed the drift rate (||~ω|| ≤ ωdr) and the predicate for total drift
states that the spacecraft pointing error should not exceed the total drift requirement
(ep ≤ etdr).
4.2.1.6 R10 and R011: 5% and 2% Settling Time
Traditionally, 5% and 2% settling time are used to describe when the response
of a second order system to a step input reaches and stays within 5% or 2% of the
steady state value, and may be estimated by a function of the systems damping ratio
ζ and natural frequency ωn from
Ts2% =
ln(0.02
√
1− ζ2)
ζωn
(38)
and
Ts5% =
ln(0.05
√
1− ζ2)
ζωn
. (39)
Since the system under analysis is not a linear, second order system, the traditional
estimation equations Eq.(38) and Eq.(39) do not apply. The system must be simulated
in order to determine the settling time. In this research, the settling time definitions
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are generalized to when the orientation of the spacecraft reaches and stays within 5%
or 2% of the desired final orientation. The 2% error e2% and 5% error e5% ranges are
based on the initial pointing error angle between the initial and final positions ep(t0).
e2% = (0.02)2acos
(
2ep(t0)
180
pi
)
(40)
e5% = (0.05)2acos
(
2ep(t0)
180
pi
)
(41)
As the settling time is a temporal property, it does not have a temporal scope like
other requirements described. The predicate is that the 5% or 2% settling time does
not exceed the required settling time, respectively (Ts2% ≤ Ts2%r and Ts5% ≤ Ts5%r).
4.2.1.7 R12: Rise Time
Like settling time, rise time is typically used to describe the time of the first peak
Tp of the step response of a linear, second order system. The rise time requirement
Trt is a way to specify the responsiveness of the system. This definition is generalized
here to first peak of the pointing error of the spacecraft, which eventually reaches a
steady state value of 0 with some deadband when the maneuver is complete. The first
peak is determined algorithmically by finding the first inflection point in the pointing
error data. The rise time also doesn’t have a temporal scope, like the settling time
requirements. The predicate for the rise time states that the time of the first pointing
error peak does not exceed the required rise time (Tp ≤ Trt).
4.2.1.8 R13: Percent Overshoot
In traditional control systems analysis, the percent overshoot is linked to the peak
time Tp, and describes the height of the first peak as a percentage of the steady-
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state response. For a step response from 0 to a steady-state value of 1, the percent
overshoot %OS can be estimated as a function of the system’s damping ratio ζ from
%OS = e(ζpi/
√
1−ζ2) × 100%. (42)
This estimate is not appropriate for the attitude control system in this research
because the system being evaluated in this research is not a second order, linear,
or performing a step response. Because the percent overshoot requirement %OSr is
primarily concerned with how far the spacecraft passes the steady state value once it
has been reached the first time, the pointing error of the system is used to analyze
this requirement. For the purposes of this research, the overshoot is defined as the
magnitude of the first peak in pointing error. The time Tp and magnitude of the
first peak ep(Tp) are determined algorithmically at the inflection point of the first
peak. Because the pointing error is at its maximum at the start of the maneuver, the
starting error ep(t0) is used to normalize the percent overshoot in
%OS = ep(Tp)/ep(t0)× 100%. (43)
Figure 21. Overshoot and Initial Error ep(t0) for an Example Slewing Maneuver
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The overshoot and initial error ep(t0) for an example slewing maneuver may be
seen in Figure 21. Like the settling time and rise time requirements, percent overshoot
does not have a specific scope. The predicate of the requirement is that the percent
overshoot must be less than the percent overshoot requirement (%OS ≤ %OSr).
4.2.1.9 Requirements Formalization Summary
As stated earlier, it is assumed that the larger scope of all of the requirements
is from the time that a maneuver is commanded to the time that a new maneuver
is commanded. Within the maneuver scope, each requirement may have a smaller
scope. The applicable scope and predicate of each requirement that were formalized
in this section are summarized in Table 4.
Table 4. Requirement Scope and Predicate Summary
Req’t Scope Predicate
R01 always |ψ˙com| ≤ ψ˙max
R02 always ψpre + ψ˙com∆t| ≤ ψmax
R03 t ≥ Ts ep ≤ er
R04* t = tf ep ≤ er
R05* t = tf ep ≤ er
R06* t = tf ep ≤ er
R07 t ≤ Ts eventually ||~ωmax|| ≥ ωr
R08 t ≥ Ts ||~ω|| ≤ ωdr
R09 t ≥ Ts ep ≤ etdr
R10 - Ts2% ≤ Ts2%r
R11 - Ts5% ≤ Ts5%r
R12 - Tωmax ≤ Trt
R13 - %OS ≤ %OSr
The * on requirements R04-R06 indicate that the scope and predicate given are
only valid for simulation cases, and may not be used to demonstrate proof that these
requirements are met.
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4.2.2 Values Assigned to the Formal Requirements
The values of the requirements used to evaluate the ACS in this research are shown
in Table 5.
Table 5. Formalized Requirement Values
Requirement Variable Description Value Units
R01 ψ˙max Maximum reaction wheel angular acceleration 181.3 rad/s
2
R02 ψmax Maximum reaction wheel angular velocity 576.0 rad/s
R03 ert Pointing accuracy threshold 1 deg
R03 ero Pointing accuracy objective 0.1 deg
R07 ωrt Slew rate threshold 3 deg/s
R07 ωro Slew rate objective 7 deg/s
R08 ωdrt Drift rate threshold 3 deg/min
R08 ωdr0 Drift rate objective 1 deg/min
R09 etdrt Total drift threshold 0.5 deg
R09 etdro Total drift objective 0.1 deg
R10 Ts5%rt 5 percent settling time threshold 5 min
R10 Ts5%ro 5 percent settling time objective 2 min
R11 Ts2%rt 2 percent settling time threshold 7 min
R11 Ts2%ro 2 percent settling time objective 3 min
R12 Trtt Rise time threshold 5 min
R12 Trto Rise time objective 2 min
R13 %OSrt Percent overshoot threshold 50 %
R13 %OSro Percent overshoot objective 25 %
4.3 Architecture Development and Formal Verification
In this section, the compositional structure of the ACS architecture and the dy-
namics of the spacecraft controller are presented. Descriptions of the PID and RTA
control architectures as well as the design of the RTA controller’s decision module are
provided. Finally, the safety properties of the PID and RTA controllers, the approach
used to verify that the safety properties are satisfied by the PID and RTA controller
implementations, and assumptions used in the FMA verification are provided.
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4.3.1 Compositional Architectecture
Breaking up a system by components to the lowest compositional level enables
formal methods analysis at the lowest functional levels of the design to be com-
posed into subsystem and system level certification arguments. As was introduced
in Sections 2.1.4 and 2.3, a compositional architecture is critical for efficient FMA.
In addition, a compositional structure promotes modularity and reuse of verification
results by allowing components such as an actuator or sensor to be changed and anal-
ysis to be completed on directly impacted portions of the system only up through the
subsystem to the system level rather than completing all of the analysis for the entire
system again.
Figure 22. 6U CubeSat Singal Flow for Model with RWA Control Actuator
For this research, the satellite is broken up compositionally into a controller, which
contains the controller software, and the environment, which includes all the hardware
that the controller interacts with. The environment is further functionally decom-
posed into the RWA and structure models. The sensors have been abstracted and it
is assumed that the controller receives perfect truth data, which could be modified in
future work. The reaction wheel is broken down one more level to individual reaction
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wheel models. The flow of signals between the components is depicted in Figure 22.
The simulated environment outputs the current system state including the orientation
of the spacecraft in a quaternion vector, the rotation rates of each of the major axes
of the spacecraft, and the rotation rates of each of the individual reaction wheels. At
each step in the simulation of the system, a unit delay is placed between the output of
the environment and the controller. The controller receives the state information from
the previous time step and uses it to calculate a commanded angular acceleration. In
the basic model, a PID controller calculates a commanded angular acceleration for
each of the reaction wheels in order to approach and eventually achieve the desired
spacecraft orientation. The alternative RTA controller architecture is described in
the Section 4.3.2. The angular acceleration commands are received and implemented
by each of the individual reaction wheels. The reaction wheels then contribute angu-
lar momentum to the RWA, which exchanges its total angular momentum with the
spacecraft structure. The simulated structure model then updates the state of the
spacecraft and the environment model outputs the system state.
4.3.2 Run Time Assurance Architecture
In the RTA control architecture, the controller block of the previous section is
replaced by an RTA controller that is decomposed into the unverified controller,
verified controller, and decision module, as described in Section 2.6.3. The unverified
controller provides the primary control commands of the RTA control architecture and
could contain any control design, including controllers that use artificial intelligence
and machine learning. The verified controller provides the backup control commands
and contains a rate-limited version of the PID controller described in Section 3.2.4,
which may be proven using formal methods not to violate the two safety properties
governing reaction wheel angular velocity and acceleration, as is shown in Section 5.1.
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The decision module contains the logic which determines which control signal, verified
or unverified, is sent to the actuator. The system state is received by the unverified
controller, verified controller, and decision module. The decision module also receives
a commanded reaction wheel acceleration vector from each of the controllers. The
signal flow in the RTA controller is summarized in Figure 23.
Figure 23. Signal Flow in the RTA Controller
4.3.3 Decision Module Design
The key component of the RTA controller is the decision module, which can be
thought of as a switching mechanism. The decision module receives the current state
of the system and the reaction wheel angular acceleration commands from each of the
two controllers. Aside from allowing the use of an intelligent or learning controller,
an RTA controller could be used to safely generate proof that an unproven control
system will not violate specific constraints over the course of hundreds, thousands,
or more hours of performance. After a period of time in service, a sufficient amount
of evidence may be generated that an unverified controller will not violate the safety
properties, and the decision module and verified controller backup could potentially
be removed.
In this research, desired safety properties are used to constrain the operating re-
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gion of the unverified controller and inform the decision to switch to a verified backup
controller. The safety properties are arranged in if-else logic, which provides several
advantages. During the design process, a designer may want to check to see if the
unverified controller violates other properties of interest, such as performance proper-
ties, beyond those used to constrain the operating envelope of the unverified controller
for safety reasons. An if-else decision tree enables the addition of a new constraint
to the unverified controller without compromising the other system constraints. In
addition, breaking properties into like groups in if-else statements allows reviewers to
quickly inspect, debug and isolate problems in the code.
Figure 24. Signal Flow in Decision Module when the Safety Properties of the System
are not Violated by the Unverified Controller
In this implementation, the decision module first checks to see if the unverified
controller has violated any of the safety properties in the past. The rationale for
checking previous instances of violations first is that if the unverified controller has
previously violated a safety property, it cannot be trusted until a reset, redesign, or
other change is implemented. Mode logic to incorporate unverified controller resets is
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Figure 25. Signal Flow in Decision Module when the Safety Properties of the System
are Violated by the Unverified Controller
left for future work. Second, the decision module then checks to see if the unverified
controller violates the maximum commanded acceleration property for any of the four
wheels in the array. Third, the decision module checks that the commanded angular
acceleration will not result in a predicted angular velocity that exceeds the maximum
velocity property for any of the four wheels. As depicted in Figure 24, if no violation of
the safety properties has occurred, and the commanded angular acceleration to each
reaction wheel from the unverified controller does not exceed the maximum allowable
limit, and the angular velocity of each wheel resulting from the commanded angular
acceleration does not exceed the maximum allowable angular velocity of the reaction
wheel array, then the decision module allows the output from the unverified controller
to pass through to the actuators. If however, a violation has previously occurred, or
the output command of the unverified controller exceeds angular acceleration limits,
or the commanded acceleration will result in an angular velocity limit violation in any
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of the wheels, then the decision module sends the output of the verified controller to
the actuators, as depicted in Figure 25.
4.3.4 Safety Properties Used in Formal Methods Analysis
In this research, formal methods are used to prove that the controller will not vio-
late two safety properties: the maximum angular velocity and the maximum angular
acceleration of the reaction wheels, as presented in Figure 26, where the subscript i
corresponds to the individual reaction wheels. These two safety properties are de-
rived requirements identified after an RWA is selected as the control actuator and are
designed to protect the motors of the reaction wheel assembly from damage. These
derived requirements, used as safety properties in the analysis are requirements R01
and R02 in Section 4.1.1. In this work, these two safety properties are used to for-
mally analyze the requirements, architecture, and model of the RTA controller. When
applied to each of the 4 reaction wheels, a total of 8 safety properties are evaluated
in the output of the RTA controller and its components.
Figure 26. Desired Safety Properties of the Controller
It is possible that timing delays and drift from the unit delays used in the ar-
chitecture to sample the system state could result in violation of the second safety
property in a continuous physical system. In this research the plant and controller
are both simulated with the same discrete timestep. Future work could investigate
the impact of the sampling delays on violation of the second property, and possibly
use more conservative switching logic in the decision module.
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4.3.5 Formal Methods Verification Approach for RTA Controller Re-
quirements and Architecture
As explained in Section 2.6.3, the unverified controller, which is treated as a “black
box” in this research cannot be proven to hold the desired safety properties in all cases
using formal methods. The verified controller, however, should be proven using formal
methods or an alternative verification method, such as extensive simulation, flight
test, or a long period of operational service. In this instance of the RTA controller,
the verified controller is analyzed using formal methods to prove that it never violates
the two safety properties. Similarly, the decision module is analyzed using formal
methods to prove that the constraints on the unverified controller are sufficient to
guarantee that decision module output never violates the controller safety properties.
The safety properties are analyzed against a model developed from the formalized
requirements in SpeAR, and against an architecture implementation developed in
AADL by AGREE. In SpeAR and AGREE, the proof evidence from each of the
RTA controller subcomponents is combined compositionally to produce proof evidence
that the RTA controller subsystem will not violate the safety properties. Figure 27
summarizes which outputs of the RTA controller and its subcomponents are formally
verified in this approach with a green check mark.
Figure 27. Expected Formal Verification Analysis Results for the RTA Controller and
Subcomponents
Limitations in SLDV prevent analysis at the RTA subsystem level, however SLDV
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may be used to prove that the safety properties are held by the model of the verified
controller and decision module.
4.3.6 Assumptions
The nature of model checking requires assumptions to be made which constrain
its searchable space. Without constraints, the model checker may assign any value of
the appropriate data type to the signals entering the component of interest, without
regard to whether meaning of these numbers is physically possible. For example, the
model checker may assign an altitude of 30,000 feet and then instantaneously assign
an altitude of 100,000 feet in the next time step, without an assumption constraining
the maximum climb rate of the aerospace model. In addition to constraining the
search space to physically possible solutions and reducing computational demands,
formal assumptions provide precise documentation of design assumptions that may
be evaluated by SMEs. Assumptions should be used with caution, as they can over
constrain the search space and ignore critical areas where the system under analysis
could enter. In this work, three assumptions are made about the decision module
input in order to constrain the model checker. First, it is assumed that the previous
reaction wheel speeds entering the decision module do not exceed the maximum
reaction wheel speeds. Mode logic to deal with the eventuality that the reaction
wheels are spinning faster than allowable at system initialization is left for future work.
Second and third, it is assumed that the verified controller output does not violate the
two safety properties governing maximum velocity or acceleration. The mathematical
expression of these assumptions is presented in Figure 28. This assumption is valid
because the rate-limited PID controller is formally proven to meet these properties as
a part of this analysis. In general, assuming that inputs to the decision module meet
properties should only occur if proof of that claim exists, otherwise the assumption
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would unnecessarily constrain the model checker.
Figure 28. Assumptions used by the Decision Module to Constrain the Formal Methods
Analysis Space
4.4 Model Development and Verification
The verified architecture provides the framework for a Simulink model and simu-
lation of the control system; however the modeling stage is the first time that the non-
linear equations that govern the controller and state equations are used. In Simulink,
like in SpeAR and AGREE, the model was broken down from the system level into
sublevels of the Controller and Environment. The file structure in Simulink was de-
signed to mimic the architectural breakdown. Simulink model reference blocks were
used to reference each of the subsystems and compose the entire system. Three files
are included in each of the subsystem folders: the Simulink model of the subsystem,
a model of the properties of the subsystem, and a verification model that references
the subsystem and properties models with model reference blocks in order to conduct
the formal analysis. The file structure is shown in Figure 29. The benefit of using
model reference and this file structure is the ability to quickly to substitute an alter-
native implementation for a subsystem to compare performance both in simulation
and verification analysis.
In Figure 29, a MATLAB m-file of constants of the simulation, a controller model,
an environment model, and a simulation model are present at the system level. De-
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Figure 29. Basic Simulink Model File Structure
pending on the size of the model, it may be desirable to place the controller and
environment in their own subsystem folders. Within each component folder is a com-
ponent model that describes the behavior of that component, a properties model that
contains the assumptions and requirements to be proven about that component, and
a verification model that references the component model and properties model to
conduct formal methods analysis of whether the component implementation meets
the requirements. The remainder of this section will explore the verification and
design of the models.
4.4.1 Component Verification with Simulink Design Verifier (SLDV)
Each requirement must be assigned a verification proof objective in SLDV. This
was done by writing the all the requirements like that shown in Figure 8 in a user-
defined function block, labeled the properties model, for each component that is to
be analyzed. The inputs of this properties model are the inputs and outputs of the
component of interest and the outputs of the properties model are the assumptions
on the inputs of the component being analyzed and a proof objective associated with
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each of the requirements. SLDV has special assumption and proof objective blocks
that may be placed on the output of the verification block for the analysis. The
outputs of the properties model may also be plotted so that the designer has a quick
time history of any property violations. A verification model combines the model of
the component, labeled a functional model, with the properties model for analysis.
An example of a verification model is presented in Figure 30.
Figure 30. PID Controller Verification Model
In Figure 30 the inputs to the verification model are on the far left side. These
inputs are the elements of the state vector for the system. Each of these inputs
feed into the functional model block, which is a Simulink model reference block that
references the model of the PID controller, and the properties model block, which is
a Simulink model reference block back to the user defined function that contains all
of the assumptions and requirements that are to be proven for the component in the
analysis. The outputs of the functional model block are also fed into the properties
model. At each of the outputs of the properties model is either a SLDV assumption
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block or proof objective block, represented as a gray circle with an “A” or “P” at the
center, respectively. Proof objective blocks that are dark gray are enabled, while proof
objective blocks that are light gray with a diagonal line through them are disabled.
Depending on the number of properties (requirements) that are to be proven about
the model, and the size and complexity of the model, it may be desirable to only prove
a few properties at a time. In Matlab 2015a and earlier versions, a bug is present
that could prevent all the properties being proven at once without error. In addition,
proving less properties could result in a faster analysis time. Finally, in Figure 30
all the outputs are plotted in a scope block. Formal methods verification in SLDV is
completed on a discretized model and controller with a fixed timestep.
4.4.2 System Level Simulation
At the system level, a simulation model uses model reference blocks to connect to
the controller and environment and simulate their interaction. The simulation model
is shown in Figure 31. Starting on the left side of Figure 31, the state of the system
Figure 31. Simulation Model of the 6U CubeSat Attitude Control Performance
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is fed into unit delay blocks to prevent a cyclic relationship between the environment
and component that results in unexpected behaviors and errors. The delay could be
placed anywhere between the controller and environment, but is placed just prior to
the controller in this model to represent the delay associated with sensing the system
state. The output of each of the unit delay blocks is a previous state component.
The previous state is then input into the controller which calculates and outputs a
commanded angular acceleration for each of the four reaction wheel actuators. The
commanded angular accelerations along with the previous state are then input into
the environment which updates and outputs the state of the system.
4.4.3 Model Assumptions and Limitations
Where possible, properties of the AFIT 6U CubeSat Bus and ACS, such as mo-
ments of inertias and wheel speeds are used. It is assumed that no external torques,
such as gravity gradient or aero torques, are acting on the CubeSat. It is also assumed
that the CubeSat rotational motion can be described by rigid body dynamics. In ad-
dition, the numerical simulation is discretized and conducted at fixed time step. The
3×3 moment of inertia matrix of the 6U CubeSat is taken from the AFIT SolidWorks
model. The moment of inertia about the reaction wheel’s spin axis was measured
using the Model XR250 Measurement Instrument[66] and the motor properties were
taken from the Maxon motor specification sheet.[72] Characterization of the hardware
may be found in Chapter VII.
4.4.4 PID Controller Model
The PID controller model accepts the system state and calculates and outputs a
commanded angular acceleration for each of the reaction wheels and is implemented
as a user-defined function block, with the code presented in Figure 32. The code
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Figure 32. PID Controller MATLAB Code
first calculates the reaction wheel array angular momentum, then calculates the error
between the current and desired quaternion. Using this information, a required change
of angular momentum is calculated and then used to calculate a commanded angular
acceleration for each of the reaction wheels. A rate limiting scheme based on R01
and R02 is included below the code shown in Figure 32. This rate limiting code is
shown in Figure 33.
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Figure 33. Controller Rate Limiting MATLAB Code
The rate limiting code functions by comparing the commanded acceleration to the
max acceleration and limiting the command to the max if the commanded acceleration
exceeds the maximum. It also checks to see whether the commanded acceleration will
result in a reaction wheel angular velocity in excess of the maximum velocity, and if
the maximum velocity will be exceeded, the commanded acceleration for that wheel
is set to 0.
4.4.5 Environment Model
The environment is separated into the reaction wheel array actuator and the
spacecraft structure. The Simulink model of the environment is shown in Figure 34.
As stated previously, the input to the environment is the previous state and the
reaction wheel angular acceleration commands from the controller. The previous
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Figure 34. Environment Simulink Model
state and commanded wheel accelerations are input into the reaction wheel array
component, which then updates and outputs the updated reaction wheel angular
velocities, as well as the angular momentum and change in angular momentum of the
RWA that acts on the spacecraft. The structure model receives the previous spacecraft
orientation and angular velocity as well as the updated RWA angular momentum and
change of angular momentum and updates and outputs the spacecraft orientation
and angular velocity.
4.4.6 Reaction Wheel Array Model
As discussed in Chapter II, the function of the RWA is to impart a change of
angular mometum on the spacecraft which must be met with an equal and opposite
change in angular momentum from the spacecraft to conserve the total angular mo-
mentum of the system in the absence of external torques. The functionality of the
RWA is broken down into instances of a reaction wheel component. The Simulink
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model of the RWA is shown in Figure 35. The RWA contains model reference blocks
Figure 35. RWA Simulink Model
that import four instances of a single reaction wheel component model. Following
composition practices from cyber-physical systems presented in Section 2.1.4, each
reaction wheel instance has unique input and output names. The code for a reac-
tion wheel component model is shown in Figure 36. Each reaction wheel instance
receives its previous angular velocity and the commanded angular acceleration from
the controller, and updates and outputs its angular velocity, angular momentum, and
change in angular momentum about the access of spin of the reaction wheel. The
change in reaction wheel angular momentum about the axis of spin is calculated as a
product of the wheel’s mass moment of inertia D and their angular acceleration. The
updated angular velocity is a sum of the previous angular velocity with the product
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Figure 36. Reaction Wheel Model Code
of the angular acceleration and the constant timestep of the simulation. The updated
reaction wheel angular momentum is a product of the reaction wheel’s mass moment
of inertia D with the updated angular velocity of the wheel.
Figure 37. RWA Model Code
The RWA is modeled with a user defined function block that receives the updated
angular velocities, angular momentums, and changes in angular momentum from
each of the reaction wheels. The code contained within the RWA block is shown in
Figure 37. With its inputs and the constant S matrix that orients each reaction wheel
with the spacecraft body frame and the mass moment of inertia D of each individual
wheel, the RWA block outputs the angular velocity of each wheel as well as the total
angular momentum and change of angular momentum of the RWA.
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4.4.7 Spacecraft Structure Model
The code contained within the structure block is shown in Figure 38, and based
on the state equations presented in Chapter III but calculates each state component
individually.
Figure 38. Spacecraft Structure Block Code
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The spacecraft structure component model accepts the previous spacecraft ori-
entation, previous spacecraft angular velocity, and internal angular momentum and
change in angular momentum of the RWA and computes and outputs the updated
spacecraft orientation and spacecraft angular velocity. The previous reaction wheel
angular velocities and accelerations are backed out of the internal angular momentum
and change of angular momentum contributed by the RWA.
4.4.8 RTA Model
When the RTA controller is used, the simulation model references the RTA con-
troller rather than the PID controller but otherwise remains unchanged. The environ-
ment component of the model remains completely the same. The controller compo-
nent references the RTA controller and the PID controller is referenced by the verified
controller component of the RTA controller design. The model of the RTA Controller
is shown in Figure 39. As seen in Figure 39, the RTA Controller model features three
main components: an unverified controller, a verified controller, and a decision mod-
ule. The unverified controller component could be any high performance controller
than cannot be verified, and is intended to be an intelligent controller; however, for
the purposes of demonstration, the unverified controller component in Figure 39 is
a model reference block that references a ramp function, which will violate require-
ment R02 that limits the maximum reaction wheel angular velocities. The verified
controller is a model reference block that calls the rate-limited PID controller. The
unverified and verified controller components both receive the previous state of the
system and output a commanded angular acceleration to each of the four reaction
wheels. The competing outputs of both the unverified and verified controllers are
inputs to the monitor and decision module component which along with the previous
state of the system is used to determine which controller output will be sent to the
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Figure 39. Run Time Assurance Controller Model
RWA. The decision module code is shown in Figure 40. As seen in Figure 40, a per-
sistent local variable is introduced called “Violation.” This local variable is used to
provide a history of whether or not the unverified controller has previously violated
the two safety properties of interest. If a previous violation has occurred, the output
of the unverified controller is deemed to be untrustworthy, and the output of the ver-
ified controller will automatically be selected as the output from the decision module,
and larger RTA controller subsystem. If a violation has not occurred previously, the
decision module component checks whether the commanded angular velocity outputs
of the unverified controller component will violate the maximum angular velocity and
maximum angular acceleration of the reaction wheels.
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Figure 40. Decision Module Code
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4.5 Feasability Analysis
As was discussed in Section 4.2.1, liveness requirements, such as a requirement that
specifies a maximum slew rate for a maneuver, are satisfied in part by showing that
it is mathematically feasible to achieve the desired requirement. Since the intent of a
slew rate requirement is to provide guidance to proper sizing of an ACS actuator, FA
may be sufficient to show satisfaction of the requirement. In order to show satisfaction
of the slew rate requirement in this research, the maximum possible spacecraft angular
velocity about each axis as a result of RWA actuation from initial spacecraft and
reaction wheel velocities of zero was studied. The constants used to do the calculations
in this section are summarized in Table 6.
Table 6. Constants Used in Feasability Analysis
Variable Description Value Units
D Reaction wheel mass moment of inertia in the axis of spin 4.12×10−5 kg-m2
ψmax Maximum reaction wheel angular velocity 576.0 rad/s
ψmax Maximum reaction wheel angular velocity 5500 rpm
Ixx Spacecraft mass moment of inertia in the x-axis 0.021875 kg-m
2
Iyy Spacecraft mass moment of inertia in the y-axis 0.0443657 kg-m
2
Izz Spacecraft mass moment of inertia in the z-axis 0.0559267 kg-m
2
First, the maximum angular velocity about the spacecraft z-axis ~ωmaxz is achieved
when all 4 wheels are spinning at their maximum velocity, since all four wheels con-
tribute equally to the spacecraft z-axis, and may be calculated with
95
~ωmaxz = −IS

ψmax
ψmax
ψmax
ψmax

. (44)
The maximum velocity about the x-axis ~ωmaxx is achieved by the use of only wheels
1 and 2 or 3 and 4, due to the orientation of the wheels in the spacecraft. If wheels 1
and 2 are accelerated to their maximum velocity from rest, a total spacecraft angular
velocity may be calculated from
~ωmaxx = −IS

ψmax
ψmax
0
0

. (45)
The maximum velocity about the y-axis ~ωmaxy is achieved by the use of only wheels
1 and 4 or 2 and 3. If wheels 1 and 4 are accelerated to their maximum velocity from
rest, a total spacecraft angular velocity may be calculated from
~ωmaxy = −IS

ψmax
0
0
ψmax

. (46)
The results of this analysis are presented in Section 5.2.
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4.6 Hypothesis Testing in Simulation
In this research, requirement satisfaction determination in simulation is based
on hypothesis testing concepts. Hypothesis testing is a formal way of determining
whether or not a system meets a specification or requirement. Traditionally, hy-
pothesis testing is used in statistics to estimate a population parameter, such as a
population mean, based on a population sample and a preconceived notion, or hy-
pothesis, of the value of that parameter.[71] Each hypothesis tested consists of a null
hypothesis H0, which is traditionally the assumed status quo, and an alternative hy-
pothesis H1), which traditionally bears the burden of proof. One way to select the
null hypothesis, is to assign it the requirement, specification, or property you are
trying to prove, and to place all other cases in the alternative hypothesis. In the
case of evaluating inequalities, the null hypothesis should always contain the equiv-
alence term (=,≤,≥).[71] The null and alternative hypothesis for each requirement
are summarized in Table 7.
Table 7. Null and Alternative Hypotheses used to Evaluate the Requirements
Req’t H0 H1 Assumption
R01 |ψ˙com| ≤ ψ˙max |ψ˙com| > ψ˙max H0 is true
R02 ψpre + ψ˙com∆t| ≤ ψmax ψpre + ψ˙com∆t| > ψmax H0 is true
R03 ep ≤ er ep > er H0 is true
R07 eventually ||~ωmax|| ≥ ωr never ||~ωmax|| ≥ ωr H1 is true
R08 ||~ω|| ≤ ωdr ||~ω|| > ωdr H0 is true
R09 ep ≤ etdr ep > etdr H0 is true
R10 Ts2% ≤ Ts2%r Ts2% > Ts2%r H1 is true
R11 Ts5% ≤ Ts5%r Ts5% > Ts5%r H1 is true
R12 Tωmax ≤ Trt Tωmax > Trt H1 is true
R13 %OS ≤ %OSr %OS > %OSr H1 is true
The requirements of the 6U CubeSat attitude control system are evaluated using
hypothesis testing within each requirement’s scope as stated previously. Require-
ments R01, R02, R03, R08, and R09 are requirements regarding variables that are
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recalculated at every timestep and are considered violated if those variables exceed
a specified value in any timestep. In the Cyber-Physical systems community, these
requirements are considered invariants of the system, as described in Section 2.2.1.
The approach used to hypothesis test these requirements is to assume that the null
hypothesis is true and if at any point during the simulation the alternative hypothesis
becomes true, then the requirement is falsified. For example it is assumed that the
reaction wheel angular accelerations are always less than or equal to the maximum
values, and if any one of the reaction wheels exceed the maximum acceleration at any
point in the simulation, the requirement is falsified. This check is done inside the
simulation loop, with a tracking variable that is permanently flagged as false for the
current timestep and all future timesteps if the requirement is violated. This check is
done with the following generalized psuedocode: if RXX is true and RXX is
within scope and variable x > RXX value, then RXX is false.
For requirement R07, the slew rate is also recalculated at every timestep and the
requirement is considered to be true if at any point in the simulation, the angular
velocity of the spacecraft is greater than or equal to the slew rate requirement. In the
cyber-physical systems community, requirement R07 is considered a liveness property,
as described in Section 2.2.1. The approach used to hypothesis test this requirement
is to assume that the null hypothesis is false, and if at any point during the simulation,
the null hypothesis becomes true, the requirement is satisfied. This requirement check
is also done inside the simulation loop, but with a variable that is permanently flagged
as true for the current timestep and all future timesteps if the requirement is satisfied
even once. This check is done with the following generalized pseudocode: if RXX
is false and variable x ≥ RXX value, then RXX is true.
Requirements R10, R11, R12, and R13 all deal with a control systems response
characteristic that is defined as a single value, and do not fall into a category of an
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Figure 41. Generalized Example of 2 and 5 Percent Settling Time Determination
invariant or liveness property. The 2% and 5% settling time (R10 and R11) may
be visualized in Figure 41, which represents the final few seconds of the maneuver.
Figure 41 depicts the pointing error at the end of the maneuver with dotted hori-
zontal lines representing a range of within 5% of the desired orientation, and dashed
horizontal lines representing a range within 2% of the desired orientation. A dotted
vertical line represents the 5% settling time, and the dashed vertical line represents
the 2% settling time. When the pointing error enters and does not leave the 5% or
2% range for the remainder of the maneuver it is 5 or 2% settled. The 2% and 5%
settling time (R10 and R11) of the simulation is set within the loop by identifying the
first timestep when the orientation of the satellite is and remains less than or equal
to 2% or 5% of the desired orientation. This assignment is done with two checks
described by the following generalized pseudocode:
if X percent settled is false and percent of final is ≤
X percent, then RXX is true and time X percent settled =
current time. if RXX is true and percent of final is >
X percent, then RXX is false.
Anytime the system is within the desired range of the final orientation, these checks set
the X percent settled flag to true and the time X percent settled to the
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current time of the simulation, but will continue to check if the system ever leaves the
desired range, and if so, will set the X percent settled flag to false. Requirement
satisfaction is determined outside the loop with the following generalized pseudocode:
if X percent settled is true and time X percent settled ≤
time required, then RXX is true.
The rise time and percent overshoot (R12 and R13) are also calculated in the
loop with associated requirements checked inside the loop. The rise time Tr and
percent overshoot %OS for an example slew maneuver are depicted in Figure 42.
Figure 42 shows the overshoot of the pointing error ep(Tr) as a horizontal dotted
Figure 42. Example of Rise Time and Percent Overshoot Determination
line and the rise time Tr as a vertical dotted line. The percent overshoot is cal-
culated as a ratio of the overshoot ep(Tr) and the initial pointing error ep(t0). In
simulation, the rise time and percent overshoot are identified by locating the first
peak in the pointing error graph, and assigning the rise time as the simulation time
where that peak occurs and percent overshoot as the pointing error as a percent
of the original pointing error. Prior to the simulation, the rise time is initialized
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as -1 seconds, and the requirement outside the loop is checked with the following
pseudocode: if rise time > 0 and rise time ≤ required rise time,
then RXX is true. The percent overshoot is perhaps the simplest check of them
all with the following pseudocode: if percent overshoot ≤
required percent overshoot, then RXX is true.
4.7 Simulation Analysis
In this section the set up for a SIM is described for a PID and RTA controller.
For the SIM of the PID and RTA controllers, a slewing maneuver was simulated from
an orientation of [0,0,0] to [90, 45, -45] degrees, as shown in Figure 43.
Figure 43. Initial and Final Orientation of the 6U CubeSat for the Simulated Slewing
Maneuver
4.7.1 Simulation Assumptions and Limitations
Several assumptions that limit the fidelity of the analysis and simulation are as
follows:
1. A simplifying assumption is made that the sensors provide perfect truth data
and the sensors themselves are abstracted out of the simulation.
2. It is assumed that the reaction wheel speeds input into the controller will not
exceed the maximum angular velocity, and that only the controller can cause
this condition to occur. In other words, the angular velocity of the reaction
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wheels is assumed to not exceed the maximum allowable before the controller
can react.
3. It is assumed that the system does not experience any external torques such as
gravity gradients or aerodynamic drag.
4. It is assumed that the system does not experience faults.
5. It is assumed that the CubeSat motion can be completely described using rigid
body dynamics.
6. The simulation was conducted with a fixed time step. Initially the simulation
was run at 10 Hz; however error propagation during the ramp phase of the
simulation was exceptionally high at approximately 30%. In the simulation
of the RTA Controller, the rate was increased to 1000 Hz, which reduced the
calculation error to 0.3% over the 200 second simulation. In the SFEDS, each
simulation was run at 500 Hz and the orientation quaternion was renormalized
at every timestep.
Properties of the reaction wheel array and 6U CubeSat testbed were measured or
estimated where possible; however some properties were assigned based on compar-
ative performance for similar systems. The 6U CubeSat testbed 3×3 inertia matrix
was taken from the AFIT SolidWorks model estimate. The individual reaction wheel
and motor 3×3 inertia matrix was measured about the spin axis using the Model
XR250 Measurement Instrument. The maximum reaction wheel speed used was the
maximum speed observed in the laboratory as measured by a laser tachometer.
4.7.2 Simulation Constants
Several constants are used in the simulations. Simulation properties are summa-
rized in Table 8, properties of the CubeSat are summarized in Table 9, properties of
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the RWA are summarized in Table 10, initial and final conditions for the SIM are
summarized in Table 11 and Table 12, and values used to create the gains of the PID
controller are summarized in Table 13.
Table 8. Simulation Properties for PID Control Simulation
Variable Description Value Units
∆t Time step of the simulation 0.001 s
t0 Initial time of the simulation 0 s
tf Final time of the simulation 100 s
n Number of simulation timesteps
tf
∆t
-
Table 9. CubeSat Properties
Variable Description Value Units
Ixx Spacecraft mass moment of inertia in the x-axis 0.021875 kg-m
2
Iyy Spacecraft mass moment of inertia in the y-axis 0.0443657 kg-m
2
Izz Spacecraft mass moment of inertia in the z-axis 0.0559267 kg-m
2
I Spacecraft mass moment of inertia matrix (diagonal matrix) kg-m2
Table 10. Reaction Wheel Array Properties
Variable Description Value Units
D Reaction wheel mass moment of inertia in the axis of spin 4.12E−5 kg-m2
ψmax Maximum reaction wheel angular velocity 576.0 rad/s
ψmax Maximum reaction wheel angular velocity 5500 rpm
τmax Maximum motor torque 0.0559267 kg-m
2
ψ˙max Maximum reaction wheel angular acceleration 181.3 rad/s
2
α1 Reaction wheel 1 angle from x-axis 315 deg
α2 Reaction wheel 2 angle from x-axis 45 deg
α3 Reaction wheel 3 angle from x-axis 135 deg
α4 Reaction wheel 4 angle from x-axis 225 deg
β Reaction wheels angle from z-axis 45 deg
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Table 11. Initial Conditions
Variable Description Value Units
Θ10 Initial rotation about the spacecraft x-axis 0 deg
Θ20 Initial rotation about the spacecraft y-axis 0 deg
Θ30 Initial rotation about the spacecraft z-axis 0 deg
q10 Initial quaternion element 1 0 -
q20 Initial quaternion element 2 0 -
q30 Initial quaternion element 3 0 -
q40 Initial quaternion element 4 1 -
Φ0 Initial principal Euler Angle 0 -
a10 Initial Euler Axis element 1 0 -
a20 Initial Euler Axis element 2 0 -
a30 Initial Euler Axis element 3 1 -
ψ˙0 Initial reaction wheel angular acceleration (all wheels) 0 rad/s
2
ψ0 Initial reaction wheel angular velocity (all wheels) 0 rad/s
ω0 Initial spacecraft angular velocity 0 rad/s
m0 Initial external torque (all axes) 0 N-m
Table 12. Final Conditions
Variable Description Value Units
Θ1f Final rotation about the 1st spacecraft axis 90 deg
Θ2f Final rotation about the 2nd spacecraft axis 45 deg
Θ3f Final rotation about the 3rd spacecraft axis -45 deg
q1f Final quaternion element 1 0.5 -
q2f Final quaternion element 2 0.5 -
q3f Final quaternion element 3 0 -
q4f Final quaternion element 4 0.7071 -
Φ0 Final principal Euler Angle 1.5708 rad
a10 Final Euler Axis element 1 0.7071 -
a20 Final Euler Axis element 2 0.7071 -
a30 Final Euler Axis element 3 0 -
Table 13. PID Control Values
Variable Description Value Units
ωn Natural frequency 1 Hz
ζ Damping ratio 5 -
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4.8 Space Filling Experimental Design Simulation Analysis
To complete the SFEDS of the PID controller, test points may be generated using
a nearly orthogonal hypercube design to vary the initial and final orientation of the
spacecraft for a slewing maneuver simulation. The initial and final pointing angle
of the satellite are described by a set of 3 rotations about the x, y, and z-axis,
which are then converted to quaternions to avoid encountering singularities during
the simulation. The initial and final rotation about the x, y, and z-axes could be any
value between 0 and 360 degrees. The x, y, and z components of the initial and final
pointing angles are the six factors, or independent variables of the design. In order
to test every possible combination of initial and final spacecraft orientations, 3606
simulations would need to be completed, which at 11 seconds a simulation, would take
over 69 million years of computing time. Fortunately much more efficient simulation
techniques have been developed to simulate a representative sample of all possible
test points. For this research, a NOLH design is used to feed inputs to the SFEDS.
257 design points were generated for the 6 factors using the spreadsheet developed by
Professor Susan M. Sanchez,[79], which employs the algorithm described by Cioppas
2002 Doctoral Dissertation.[29] The 257 design points, one for each unique input and
output in the NOLH design, are read by a MATLAB m-file that simulates 257 runs.
4.9 Reachability Analysis
As introduced in Section 4.2.1.3, requirements R04, R05, and R06 all deal with the
concept of reachability. Each of these requirements state that the spacecraft should be
capable of pointing in any direction from 0 to 360 degrees about a particular axis: x-
axis for R04, y-axis for R05, and z-axis for R06. While reachability could be formally
proven for a linear system by proving that the system is completely controllable using
a controllability matrix, analysis of a nonlinear system’s reachability is not trivial. In
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this research a MATLAB batch simulation is used to provide some insight into the
reachable space of the ACS, by simulating slews from 0 degrees to each whole number
degree from 1 to 360 for each axis individually. This results in 360 test points per
axis for a total of 1080 test points overall. If the pointing error at the end of the
100 second simulated test case is less than 0.001 degrees, then the final angle in the
simulation is considered to be reachable.
Figure 44. Reachability Simulation Test Points Representation
To visualize where these test points are located, two graphs were created as shown
in Figure 44. Figure 44 (a) shows the test points as a product of their Euler axis
with their Euler angle, so that they cover the x, y, and z-axes with values from -pi
to pi. Figure 44 (b) shows the test points in degrees along the x, y, and z-axes, with
points at every degree from 1 to 360. The results of this analysis are presented in
Section 5.5. The use of alternative reachability analysis techniques such as a Flow*
[27] simulation of reachable system states, or that presented by Lewis [65] or Bradley
et al. [21] are left for future work.
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4.10 Summary
Chapter IV described the requirements to be verified and the architecture and
models developed for the research before describing how the FMA, SIM, SFEDS, and
FA are conducted. The results of these analyses will be presented in Chapter V.
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V. Results
In Chapter V, results from the analysis techniques described in the Chapter IV
are presented. Results from FMA and SIM of the PID and RTA controller designs,
FA of the slew rate requirement, SFEDS of the PID controller design, and batch
simulation for the reachability of the ACS are presented as verification evidence that
the requirements are satisfied by the controller implementation.
5.1 Formal Methods Analysis Results
Results of the FMA of the RTA controller are shown in this section. The PID
controller is used as the verified controller component in the RTA controller design,
so FMA is conducted on it as part of the compositional verification of the RTA con-
troller. The RTA controller design was successfully implemented in SpeAR, AADL,
and Simulink. Using SpeAR’s reason tool, AGREE, and SLDV, the implementation
of the controller in each of these tools was analyzed against the eight safety prop-
erties presented in Section 4.3.4. In SpeAR and AGREE, the unverified controller,
verified controller, and decision module were all analyzed separately before they were
combined compositionally into the RTA controller and analyzed at the controller sub-
system level. All eight of the properties were proven valid for the verified controller,
decision module, and larger RTA controller subsystem; however, the properties could
not be proven for the unverified controller. In SLDV, analysis could only be com-
pleted on the verified controller and decision module, but could not be completed at
the RTA controller subsystem level, due to limitations in SLDV analysis capabilities.
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5.1.1 SpeAR Requirements Analysis Results
Using the methods described in Sections 2.4.1 and 4.3.2, the requirements of the
system were analyzed to determine if they property constrain the design to prevent
violation of system safety properties. The results of the SpeAR analysis presented
in Figure 45 show that all eight safety properties presented in Section 4.3.4 are valid
at the RTA controller level and for all of the RTA controller components except
the unverified controller component. In Figure 45, the results of the RTA controller
Figure 45. Results of SpeAR Analysis on RTA Controller Design
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level analysis are listed at the top, the results of the unverified controller analysis
are listed second, the results of the verified controller analysis are listed third, and
the results of the decision module analysis are listed last. The green checkmarks and
“Valid” result indicate where the safety properties are held, while the red exclamation
point and “Invalid” indicate which safety properties are not held. These results
are as expected. In other words, based on the assumptions on the input to each
of the subsystems, and the derived requirements of the subsystems, it was proven
that no case existed in which the output of the verified controller, decision module,
or RTA controller as a whole would violate the safety properties of the system in
abstracted requirements and architecture levels of the system description. SpeAR
is being developed by members of the same organization responsible for developing
AGREE and uses the same underlying solvers as AGREE, JKind and Z3. SpeAR
and AGREE are both designed to enable compositional verification, a capability that
allows SpeAR and AGREE to pull information from the subcomponent level analysis
up to the subsystem level analysis. For this research, it means that SpeAR and
AGREE can pull information from the verified controller, unverified controller, and
decision module up to complete analysis of the RTA controller as a whole. If desired,
it could pull information from the controller and environment levels up to complete
a system level verification as well. In SpeAR, compositional verification of the RTA
controller took less than a second to complete. This short analysis timeframe makes
SpeAR analysis a valuable tool that can be run quickly to provide feedback during
requirements development each time that an assumption, requirement, or derived
requirement is added, deleted, or changed.
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5.1.2 AGREE Architecture Analysis Results
Using the methods described in Sections 2.4.2 and 4.3.2, an architecture imple-
mentation of the ACS in AADL was analyzed using AGREE to determine if the
implementation violates the safety properties presented in Section 4.3.4. The results
of the AGREE analysis for the RTA controller are shown in Figure 46. While the
SpeAR analysis took less than 1 second to complete, AGREE analysis took approx-
imately 16 seconds, which also makes it a useful tool to quickly provide feedback
to designers when architecture information is added, deleted or modified during ar-
chitecture development. The results in Figure 46 are expanded at the RTA level to
reveal the velocity and acceleration properties for each wheel. The decision module
(DM sub) and verified controller (VER sub) properties are all also proven; however
the properties are invalid for the unverified controller (UNV sub), as indicated by
the red box with containing the exclamation mark. In order to completely prove the
RTA controller, one simply needs to remove the safety property guarantees from the
unverified controller; however the safety properties are included in the SpeAR and
AGREE analysis shown results here for demonstration purposes.
Figure 46. Results of AGREE Analysis on RTA Controller Design
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5.1.3 SLDV Model Analysis Results
Using the methods described in Sections 2.4.3 and 4.3.2, the Simulink model of
the ACS could be analyzed using SLDV at the component level but the size of the
model prevented RTA level analysis from being completed. Theoretically, analysis
at the RTA level should be possible using model reference; however the Simulink
model contains a much more detailed implementation of the system than the SpeAR
and AADL model, resulting in a more computationally complex analysis task. For
example, SLDV analysis of the decision module was able to prove all 8 of the safety
properties as valid; however it took SLDV 23 seconds to complete the analysis for
the decision module, while it took SpeAR less than 1 second and AGREE about
16 seconds to prove all the properties of the RTA controller, including the RTA
controller’s decision module and verified controller subcomponents. SLDV results of
the rate-limited PID controller analysis were similar. When trying to prove RTA
controller level analysis, the results were undecided due to nonlinearities. This is
likely the result of a bug in SLDV which is expected to be fixed in future releases
and may enable RTA controller level analysis in the near future. The result of the
SLDV analysis for the decision module from the analysis report, which includes the
23 second analysis time, is shown in Figure 47. The result of the SLDV analysis for
the PID controller in the SLDV log window, which displays during and after analysis,
is shown in Figure 48.
Figure 47. Results of Simulink Design Verifier Analysis on the Decision Module
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Figure 48. Results of Simulink Design Verifier Analysis on the PID Controller used as
the Verified Controller
5.2 Feasibility Analysis Results
Using the methods prescribed in Section 4.5, analysis was conducted to determine
if it is feasible for the RWA selected to produce the desired minimum slew rate
specified by requirement R07 in Section 4.1.1. First, a maximum spacecraft angular
velocity about the z-axis of the spacecraft ~ωmaxz was found to be 68.7 degrees per
second or 1.20 radians per second, with no angular velocity about the spacecraft x
and y-axes, since the orientation of the wheels cancels out contributions to those axes.
The maximum angular velocity about the spacecraft x-axis ~ωmaxx was found to be
62.2 degrees per second or 1.08 radians per second, with 34.4 degrees per second or
0.60 radians per second generated about the z-axis due to the contribution of the
wheels’ angular momentum to the z-axis in addition to the x-axis. The maximum
velocity about the spacecraft y-axis ~ωmaxy was found to be 30.6 degrees per second
or 0.53 radians per second, with 34.4 degrees per second or 0.60 radians per second
generated about the z-axis. The results of the feasibility analysis are summarized
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in Table 14. The maximum possible velocity about each spacecraft axis when the
Table 14. Maximum Possible Spacecraft Angular Velocity About Each Axis
Variable Axis Value Units
~ωmaxx x 62.2 deg/s
~ωmaxy y 30.6 deg/s
~ωmaxz z 68.7 deg/s
spacecraft and reaction wheels start at rest and the reaction wheels are accelerated
to their maximum velocity, as described in Section 4.5, far exceed the threshold and
objective slew rates of 3 and 7 degrees per second, respectively. Based on these results,
not only is it feasible for the spacecraft to reach the desired slew rate, the RWA is
likely over designed, and the requirement may be met by a lower mass RWA design.
5.3 Simulation Analysis Results
In this section, results are presented for the SIM of the PID controller only. Then
SIM results for the RTA controller are presented for a case where the unverified
controller is a velocity ramp function, which is guaranteed to violate the safety prop-
erties for the purpose of simulating the transition from the unverified to the verified
controller within the RTA controller architecture.
5.3.1 Simulation of PID Controller
Using the methods, assumptions, and constants from Sections 4.6, 4.7.1, and 4.7.2,
a simulation was conducted to show the system requirements are met by the PID
controller design. A summary of the results of the requirement analysis is shown in
Table 15.
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Table 15. Results of the Requirements Analysis on the PID Control Design for a Single
Simulation Case
Req’t Description Threshold Objective
R01 |ψ˙com| ≤ ψ˙max satisfied satisfied
R02 ψpre + ψ˙com∆t| ≤ ψmax satisfied satisfied
R03 ep ≤ er satisfied satisfied
R07 eventually ||~ωmax|| ≥ ωr satisfied satisfied
R08 ||~ω|| ≤ ωdr satisfied satisfied
R09 ep ≤ etdr satisfied satisfied
R10 Ts2% ≤ Ts2%r satisfied satisfied
R11 Ts5% ≤ Ts5%r satisfied satisfied
R12 Tωmax ≤ Trt satisfied satisfied
R13 %OS ≤ %OSr satisfied satisfied
Figure 49. Performance Requirements for PID Controller Simulation
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Figure 50. Control Systems Analysis Requirements for Simutaion with Reaction Wheel
Array Actuation Only
To visualize the requirements, several plots were created as shown in Figure 49
and Figure 50. As seen in Figure 49 (a) and (b), the wheel angular acceleration and
wheel angular velocity plots for all 4 of the wheels are well within the maximum limits,
showing satisfaction of R01 and R02, respectively. The pointing error in Figure 49 (c),
drift rate in Figure 49 (e), and total drift in Figure 49 (f) are all within the threshold
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and objective requirements, showing satisfaction of requirements R03, R08, and R09
respectively. The slew rate in Figure 49 (d) exceeds the threshold and requirement,
showing satisfaction of requirement R07.
As seen in Figure 50 (a), the 2 and 5 percent settled times are far less than the
required settled time objectives. In Figure 50 (b) it may be seen that the rise time
satisfies the rise time threshold and objective requirements, depicted as vertical lines
on the plots. In fact, the rise time of 13.1 seconds is far less than the 120 second
objective. As seen in Figure 50 (c) the percent overshoot requirement is also well
below the objective and threshold for the requirement. A summary of the settling
times, rise time, and percent overshoot is displayed in Table 16.
Table 16. Control Systems Analysis Requirements Summary
Req’t Variable Value units
R10 Ts2% 18.8 s
R11 Ts5% 20.6 s
R12 Tωmax 13.1 s
R13 %OS 13.2 %
5.3.2 Simulation of Run Time Assured Controller
For the purposes of demonstrating the switching action of the RTA controller,
a second simulation was conducted using the setup described in Sections 4.6, 4.7.1,
and 4.7.2 for the model described in Section 4.4.8. A ramp function with a constant
acceleration command to each of the reaction wheels was used in the place of the
unverified controller because it was sure to violate system safety properties. The
results of the slewing maneuever simulation are shown in Figure 51.
The spacecraft orientation is expressed as a quaternion and eventually completes
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Figure 51. RTA Simulation with a Constant RWA Acceleration Ramp as Unverified
Controller
the desired maneuver as seen in Figure 51 (a). As seen in Figure 51 (d), the unveri-
fied controller (ramp function) maintains control by issuing the constant acceleration
command until 31 seconds into the simulation when the reaction wheel velocity shown
in Figure 51 (c) reaches the maximum allowable. The spacecraft reaches a maximum
angular velocity of about 1.2 radians per second about the z-axis under the control
of the ramp function as seen in Figure 51 (b). When the reaction wheels reach their
maximum velocity, the decision module switches command to the verified controller
(rate-limited PID controller) for the remainder of the slewing maneuver. As seen in
Figure 51 (d), the rate-limited PID controller reaches the maximum negative reaction
wheel acceleration possible immediately after the switch in an attempt to dramati-
cally decrease wheel speeds. After a few seconds, the acceleration commands leave
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the maximum acceleration as the PID controller begins to settle out and eventually
reach the desired spacecraft orientation.
5.4 Space Filling Experimental Design Simulation of the PID Controller
In this section, results are presented for the SFEDS of the PID controller. Using
the SFEDS setup described in Section 4.8, 257 test points in a nearly orthogonal
hypercube design were used to vary the initial and final orientation of the spacecraft
for a slewing maneuver SFEDS. The total number of violations for each requirement
when 257 test points were simulated with the rate-limited PID control design are
summarized in Table 17.
Table 17. Number of Requirement Violations for PID Control With Rate Limiting
Req’t Description Violations
R01 |ψ˙com| ≤ ψ˙max 0
R02 ψpre + ψ˙com∆t| ≤ ψmax 0
R03t ep ≤ ert 0
R03o ep ≤ ero 0
R07t eventually ||~ωmax|| ≥ ωrt 2
R07o eventually ||~ωmax|| ≥ ωro 6
R08t ||~ω|| ≤ ωdrt 0
R08o ||~ω|| ≤ ωdro 0
R09t ep ≤ etdrt 0
R09o ep ≤ etdro 0
R10t Ts2% ≤ Ts2%rt 0
R10o Ts2% ≤ Ts2%ro 0
R11t Ts5% ≤ Ts5%rt 0
R11o Ts5% ≤ Ts5%ro 0
R12t Tωmax ≤ Trtt 0
R12o Tωmax ≤ Trto 0
R13t %OS ≤ %OSrt 257
R13o %OS ≤ %OSro 257
As seen in Table 17, only requirements R07 and R13 were violated. These viola-
tions will be explored in more detail in the next two subsections.
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5.4.1 Slew Rate Requirement Violations
All violations of R07, which specifies a minimum value for the maximum slewing
rate achieved in the maneuver, occur below 25 degrees of net angle, defined as the
pointing error ep(t0) between the initial and final orientation. These violations likely
occur because the spacecraft angular velocity does not need to be very large for a
slewing maneuver across a small angle versus a large angle. For small angles, achieving
the desired slew rate during the maneuver would likely result in very large overshoots
of the desired orientation. The pointing error and slew rate of the cases where R07
were violated are plotted in Figure 52.
Figure 52. Pointing Error and Slew Rate for Test Cases Violating R07
From Figure 52 (a), it can be seen that the violating cases all reach their desired
final orientation in approximately 60 seconds or less without excessive slew rates,
which are shown in Figure 52 (b). The initial and final orientations are exactly
the same for one of the test points, so no slew rate is required at all. The slew
rate violations encountered in the SFEDS likely do not violate the intent of the
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requirement, which is that the system responds quickly to orientation commands.
For this reason, SFEDS is probably not the best way to determine whether a slew
rate requirement has been violated; however, SFEDS analysis does give designers
a good idea of how fast the spacecraft is slewing across a range of inputs. In this
case, 255 of 257 requirements featured a maximum slew rate in excess of 3 degrees
per second and 251 of 257 requirements featured a maximum slew rate in excess 7
degrees per second during the maneuver.
5.4.2 Percent Overshoot Requirement Violations
The percent overshoot requirement is a particularly problematic requirement be-
cause it is essentially a moving target that changes based on the maneuver com-
manded. Based on the original definition of percent overshoot that was calculated
as a ratio of the first inflection point and the initial error ep(t0), all cases violated
the percent overshoot requirement. A plot of the percent overshoot versus net an-
gle, or initial error is shown in Figure 53. Many violations likely occur because the
Figure 53. Percent Overshoot Versus Net Slew Angle
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percent overshoot is calculated as a ratio of the net angle, defined as the pointing
error ep(t0) between the initial and final orientation. When the net angle is small,
even a small overshoot angle is a much larger percentage of that net maneuver. This
may be observed in Test Point 41, shown in Figure 54. In many cases an inflection
Figure 54. Pointing Error from Test Case 41 with a Large Percent Overshoot for a
Small Angle Maneuver
Figure 55. Pointing Error from Test Case 163 with Initial Divergence from the Desired
Angle
point was identified in the simulation with in the first few time steps of the simula-
tion. In some cases, this was an extremely small increase in the pointing error after
the initial time step before the error decreased. In other cases, the percent error
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increased significantly before approaching the desired orientation, as observed in test
point 163 shown in Figure 55. Test cases such as 163 prompted a re-evaluation of
the definition of the percent overshoot. Two new definitions were generated: Max
Overshoot and Max Deviation. Max Overshoot is the maximum pointing error en-
countered after the pointing error has crossed the zero line. Max Deviation is the
maximum pointing error encountered over the course of the simulated test point.
These two characteristics are labeled in Figure 56. In the first alternative percent
Figure 56. Max Deviation, Max Overshoot, and Initial Error ep(t0) Definitions
overshoot definition, the percent overshoot is a ratio of the max overshoot and the
initial error ep(t0). This alternative percent overshoot is plotted against the net angle
in Figure 57. In the second alternative percent overshoot definition, the percent over-
shoot is a ratio of the max overshoot and the max deviation. The second alternative
percent overshoot is plotted against the net angle for each test point in Figure 58.
The number of violations of requirement R13 based on the two alternative definitions
of percent overshoot are summarized in Table 18. While percent overshoot may be
used as a performance requirement for control systems, the sensitivity of requirement
satisfaction to the magnitude of the maneuver makes this requirement particularly
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vulnerable to violations. Instead of using a percent overshoot, a max deviation or
raw max overshoot value may be a more appropriate requirement.
Figure 57. First Alternative Percent Overshoot versus Initial Error
Figure 58. Second Alternative Percent Overshoot versus Initial Error
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Table 18. Requirement Violations for Alternative Percent Overshoot Definitions
Requirement Violations
R13t (alternative 1) 76
R13o (alternative 1) 126
R13t (alternative 2) 63
R13o (alternative 2) 102
5.4.3 Using JMP to Identify a Statistical Response Model of Percent
Overshoot
JMP was used to identify if any models could be generated based on the raw
data used to determine requirement violations. No statistical models of any meaning
could be developed. In other words, all models had an R2 value near 0, indicating
that there was a very poor correlation between the model and the data. This lack
of a statistical model for the response of the requirements may be a product of the
nonlinear nature of the simulated controller and satellite dynamics. Variations of the
requirements were analyzed as a result of this data. The only variation of data used
to generate requirements that resulted in a relatively high R2 value was a difference
between the raw values of the max overshoot and max deviation as a function of the
net angle, which was found to have a statistical model with an R2 value of 0.712,
which is relatively strong correlation when the maximum possible R2 value is 1. The
statistical model generated by JMP for this data is shown in Eq.(47).
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180
pi
(
0.0346737090350608 + 0.920855002187844(ep(t0))+
(
(ep(t0)− 0.627294612945526)(ep(t0)− 0.627294612945526)
)
(−0.00899644953544666)
)
.
(47)
The difference in max deviation and max overshoot for each of the test points is
plotted against the net angle as black dots, and the statistical model for the data is
plotted as a blue line in Figure. 59.
Figure 59. Max Deviation - Max Overshoot versus Initial Error and Model
5.4.4 Impact of Rate Limits on Requirement R01 and R02 Violations
A second SFEDS was conducted using the same 257 test points to determine the
impact of the rate limits on the PID controller by observing how often R01 and R02
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would be violated in the absence of rate limiting. The results of this simulation found
that the PID controller without rate limiting violated the maximum acceleration
requirement R01 in 63 cases, all within the first few seconds of the simulation. No
violations of R02 occurred in the 257 simulated cases. When rate limits are placed
on the PID controller, as derived requirements of R01 and R02, then R01 and R02
are not violated. The violations for each of the remaining requirements are the same
as the violation results for the PID control with rate limiting. In other words, rate
limiting only prevents violations of requirement R01.
5.4.5 Impact of Error Propagation on Requirement Violations
A major challenge encountered in the SFEDS analysis was balancing error prop-
agation with simulation runtime for a discretized simulation. In order to run the dis-
cretized simulation at a reasonable rate for 257 test points, a timestep of 0.005 seconds
was used. However, even with this small timestep, error propagation throughout the
simulation led to a number of requirements violations that were not observed when a
correction was added to the orientation calculation in the simulation code. Require-
ments R03 and R09 were particularly impacted as these requirements deal directly
with the error between the observed and desired pointing angle of the spacecraft.
Without any corrections, R03 and R09 objectives were violated in the same 64 test
cases and the threshold values of R03 and R09 were violated in 5 and 12 test cases
respectively. In addition, the objective and threshold of the rise time requirement,
R12, was violated in 3 cases. The requirement violations due to the propagation of
calculation errors in the simulation are summarized in Table 19. To remedy this error,
the quaternion vector was renormalized at each time step. Because the magnitude of
the quaternion should always be 1, each of the quaternion components was divided
by the magnitude of the quaternion at each time step to correct for orientation er-
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Table 19. Requirement Violations Due to Error Propagation
Req’t Description Violations
R03t ep ≤ ert 5
R03o ep ≤ ero 64
R09t ep ≤ etdrt 12
R09o ep ≤ etdro 63
R12t Tωmax ≤ Trtt 3
R12o Tωmax ≤ Trto 3
rors. This does not prevent errors from building up in the spacecraft velocity over the
course of the simulation, so it is possible a small error persisted in the final SFEDS.
5.4.6 Space Filling Experimental Design Simulation Summary
The results of the SFEDS showed that requirement violations were only encoun-
tered in requirement R07, which is met if a minimum value of the maximum slew rate
is observed in the maneuver, and R13, which deals with percent overshoot. Explana-
tions were provided for these violations and alternative percent overshoot definitions
were explored. It was found that in many cases, a small inflection point in pointing
error ep occurred immediately after simulation initialization or the pointing error ini-
tially diverged from the desired orientation as seen in Figure 55. A statistical model
could not be generated for any of the requirements violations when compared with
the net slewing angle; however a statistical model could be generated to relate the
different between the max deviation of the pointing error from the desired angle and
the max overshoot. Rate limiting of the PID controller was found to prevent violation
of requirement R01, which limits the maximum acceleration of the reaction wheels,
in 63 cases. A mitigation technique for calculation errors was presented. It was noted
that the SFEDS was not appropriate for determining satisfaction of a slew rate re-
quirement and that a requirement on overshoot limitations may better be expressed
as a max deviation or max overshoot value in degrees or radians.
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5.5 Reachability Analysis Results
A description of the reachability simulation setup is provided in Section 4.9. As
was described, an angle is considered to be reachable if the pointing error at the end
of the 100 second simulated test case is less than 0.001 degrees. All 1080 test points
were determined to be reachable. Plots of the pointing error over time for each axis
may be seen in Figure 60.
Figure 60. Reachability Pointing Error
Figure 60 (a) is a simulation of all the points on the x-axis, Figure 60 (b) is a
simulation of all points on the y-axis, and Figure 60 (c) is a simulation of all points
on the z-axis. Because the controller maneuvers across the shortest distance between
two angles, the maximum error is 180 degrees. An unexpected insight gained from
this set of test points is the difference in overshoot by axis. The x-axis simulated
pointing error overshoots the desired angle by a maximum of 27.9 degrees, the y-axis
simulated pointing error overshoots the desired angle by a maximum of approximately
9.9 degrees, and the z-axis simulated pointing error overshoots the desired angle by
a maximum of 5.1 degrees. It makes sense that the z-axis would have the lowest
overshoot because all four reaction wheels may have the same maximum contribution
to the z-axis, giving the system the most control authority about the z-axis. The
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difference between the x and y occurs because the spacecraft moment of inertia about
the y-axis is more than twice the moment of inertia about the spacecraft x-axis.
5.6 Summary
In Chapter V, results from FMA, SIM, SFEDS, reachability SFEDS, and FA show
satisfaction of all of the requirements of the PID controller with the exception of the
percent overshoot requirement. It is recommended that a max overshoot value be
used, rather than a percent overshoot requirement that is highly sensitive to the initial
error. FMA and SIM results of the RTA controller were also presented showing that
the two safety requirements that limit the maximum angular velocity and acceleration
of the wheels are always satisfied by the RTA implementation.
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VI. Conclusions and Recommendations
6.1 Research Summary
The scope of this research was to generate verification evidence that a controller
implementation satisfied a set of requirements during the early design stages of a
theoretical RTA controller design. The RTA controller’s unverified controller compo-
nent in this research was an abstracted “black box” controller that could represent
any complex, learning, or intelligent controller design; however this controller could
also be a “gray box” or “white box” controller that provides more knowledge of the
unverified controller behavior. The RTA controller’s verified controller was a rate-
limited PID controller. A decision module was added that monitored the behavior
of the unverified and switched to the verified controller to prevent safety property
violations. The RTA controller’s verified controller and decision module subcompo-
nents and the composition of the RTA controller were analyzed with FMA to prove
that safety requirements of the system are never violated. This result means that no
matter what control design is inserted in the unverified controller block, as long as
the inputs to the RTA controller are within a certain range, the output of the RTA
controller is guaranteed to not violate safety properties. Properties of the spacecraft
and RWA were analyzed using FA. The rate-limited nonlinear PID controller per-
formance was analyzed with SIM and SFEDS to understand under what conditions
performance requirements were satisfied or violated. Finally, a constant acceleration,
velocity ramp function was inserted into the unverified controller and SIM analysis
was performed to demonstrate the performance of the system when safety properties
were threatened and the decision module switched control to the verified controller.
The approach presented in this research lays the groundwork for formally verified
spacecraft attitude RTA control designs. Initial results on the application to a 6U
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CubeSat ACS with RWA actuation indicate that the use of an RTA architecture is a
viable way to assure that unverified control algorithms do not violate a predefined set
of properties. However, much more work is required to build a controller design that
is robust to faults and environmental conditions and interface that controller with
the spacecraft hardware. In addition, the decision module presented in this work
only monitored and switched on safety property violations, but does not consider
performance properties.
This work produced the first application and evaluation of SpeAR, AGREE, and
SLDV to provide traceable verification evidence for nonlinear system control in the
requirements, architecture and modeling design phases. In order to provide verifica-
tion evidence from the analysis methods used in this research, a new methodology
was developed to formally describe different classes of controls requirements. In addi-
tion a new methodology was developed to combine the use of RTA, FA, FMA, SIM,
and SFEDS to provide appropriate verification evidence for a spacecraft ACS design.
Traceability of the requirements analysis in each design phase from requirements to
architecture to models was accomplished with a consistent naming convention.
6.2 Conclusions
In this section, conclusions are presented about the selection of appropriate veri-
fication techniques, coverage of the design space by those techniques, the advantages
and disadvantages of FMA, and the impact of simulation errors in this analysis.
6.2.1 Selection of Appropriate Verification Techniques
Appropriate combinations of verification techniques were identified based on the
intent, scope, and complexity of each requirement as well as the coverage provided
by the verification technique, which will be discussed in Section 6.2.2. Verification
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of first two requirements in this research could be isolated to the controller software,
and requirement satisfaction could be formally proven. This formal proof was possible
because the rate limiting of the PID controller and the switching conditions of the
RTA controllers decision module were implemented with linear equations. For these
first two requirements, FMA was computationally inexpensive and provided complete
coverage of the design space. However, additional insight could be gained on whether
these requirements would be violated without rate limiting for the PID controller
using SIM and SFEDS. Verification evidence for the remaining requirements, with the
exception of those dealing with reachability, could also be generated using SIM and
SFEDS, which allow visualization of requirement satisfaction, and identification of
trends requirement violation conditions. A focused batch simulation for reachability
analysis can provide some insight into reachability requirement satisfaction; however,
coverage by such a technique is extremely limited. Finally, appropriate verification
technique selection for liveness requirements, such as a achievement of a specific slew
rate, is intent driven. Since the slew rate requirement intent is to provide guidance
to proper sizing of control actuators, FA was conducted in this research to show that
the actuator selected was capable of satisfying the requirement.
6.2.2 Verification Technique Design Space Coverage
The 6U ACS used in this research is designed to slew from one pointing orientation
to another pointing orientation. Perhaps the most intuitive way to visualize the
initial and final orientations is through an Euler Angle representation, presented in
Section 3.2.1.2, where the orientation is represented as three successive rotations
about a individual axes. The possible space of initial and final positions can then
be visualized as a cube with axes labeled θ1, θ2, and θ3, that each range from 0 to
360 degrees. The SIM analysis conducted in this research, which featured a single
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simulation case, can then be visualized as Figure 61, where the initial position is
represented by a ◦, the final position is represented by an ×, and a line is drawn
showing the shortest distance between the two points.
Figure 61. Experimental Space Coverage by the Single Simulation Case in this Research
Extending coverage from a single simulation case using a space filling experimental
design, like that used in the SFEDS in this research, results in coverage represented
by Figure 62.
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Figure 62. Experimental Space Coverage by the Space Filling Experimental Design
Simulation in this Research
The version of the SFEDS used to do an initial reachability analysis along each
axis resulted in design space coverage represented by Figure 63.
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Figure 63. Experimental Space Coverage by the Reachability Simulation in this Re-
search
The power of FMA becomes evident in the visualization of coverage of the entire
design space as seen in Figure 64.
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Figure 64. Experimental Space Coverage by the Formal Methods Analysis in this
Research
While FMA provides complete coverage of the design space, current limitations
in formal methods tools, only allowed it to be used to verify 2 of the 13 requirements.
Conducting a SIM gives a designer initial insight into the performance of the system
with relatively little computational burden and allows for visualization of require-
ments satisfaction for all 13 requirements. Conducting an SFEDS gives even more
insight and confidence in the design and helps to identify problem areas in the exper-
imental space where requirement violations are more likely to occur; however SFEDS
can be computationally expensive. To conduct an initial reachability analysis to gain
insight into requirements satisfaction, a simulation can be conducted in a targeted
way such as that presented in this research; however even this leaves considerable
open experimental design space.
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6.2.3 Formal Methods Analysis Tools
The power of formal methods lies in its ability to prove that for a range of in-
put conditions, the output of a component will never violate safety properties or
requirements within some number of steps. However, proof is limited to invariant
requirements that require something always holds, or bounded liveness requirements
that require something occur within a fixed timeframe. Controls performance require-
ments such as settling time, rise time, and percent overshoot which do not have a
temporal or conditional scope cannot be verified in the SpeAR, AGREE, or SLDV.
The most useful capabilities of SpeAR and AGREE are their compositional ver-
ification and their ability to do abstract analysis. SpeAR and AGREE can analyze
property or requirement satisfaction at the lowest levels of the system and compose
those results at increasingly higher levels up to the system level, which is an extremely
powerful approach to dealing with the state-space explosion problem. In addition,
analysis can be done on abstract variables. As long as the type of the variable is
provided, an expression or value does not have to be assigned to it in order for it to
be analyzed formally. This allowed analysis of the control systems outputs by only
specifying the rate limiting strategy for the PID controller, without specifying the
underlying PID control equations and equations of motion.
The power of using Simulink and SLDV is the ability to express and simulate
nonlinear equations and use model reference to compose a simulation. However, values
or expressions have to be assigned to each variable in SLDV and formal verification
can only be completed at the component level because compositional verification is
not currently supported. However, the rapid development cycle and improvements in
SLDV make this a possible addition in a future release.
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6.2.4 Simulation Errors
Like many cyber-physical systems in which the controller is discretized, the simu-
lations in this researched were subject to calculation errors. When simulations were
run at 10 Hz, some calculations were 30% off at the end of a 200 second simulation.
At 1000 Hz, these errors were reduced to 0.3% over a 200 second simulation. In order
to reduce errors in the SFEDS which was run at 500 Hz, the quaternion vector was
renormalized at each time step. This does not prevent errors from building up in the
spacecraft velocity over the course of the simulation, so it is possible a small error
persisted in the final SFEDS.
6.3 Recommendations
In this section, recommendations are made for ACS requirement specification and
future development of the formal methods tools used in this research.
6.3.1 Requirement Specification
All of the formalized requirements initially described in Section 4.2.1 worked well
for analysis in this research with the exception of percent overshoot. Because percent
overshoot is a ratio of the initial error, and a small inflection point often occurred right
after the maneuver initialed or the orientation moved away from the desired position
before it moved toward it in some cases, the definition provided in Section 4.2.1 did
not work well for the analysis. Two alternative definitions were defined in Section 5.4.
However, the biggest recommendation was that the overshoot requirement be a raw
overshoot requirement such as 30 or 40 degrees rather than a percentage of the initial
pointing error.
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6.3.2 Formal Methods Toolset Development Recommendations
The formal methods tools evaluated in this research are becoming more capable
and useable, but still have several gaps. The tools used to analyze the requirements,
architecture and model of the 6U CubeSat reaction wheel array attitude control sub-
system are sufficient to express system behavior and requirements that can be defined
with simple math and inequalities; however, a large gap still remains in their non-
linear system analysis capabilities making them suitable for some applications, but
not sufficient for complete analysis of the complex and nonlinear spacecraft attitude
control example presented in this thesis.
Throughout this research, several gaps were identified in the SpeAR, AGREE, and
SLDV tools that could greatly improve their usability and applicability to complex
systems such as the 6U CubeSat ACS. While most recommendations are specific to
individual tools, all of the tools could improve with nonlinear math support. The
largest barrier for the 6U CubeSat requirements analysis is the lack of support for
nonlinear math in SpeAR, AGREE, and SLDV, making exhaustive proof of the 6U
CubeSat requirements infeasible without first linearizing the system.
SpeAR and AGREE could both be improved with support for matrix multiplica-
tion and a built-in notion of time. In the case of the 6U CubeSat, the PID controller
and equations of motions for the satellite are most succinctly expressed and easiest to
debug in matrix form. Without matrix support, these equations become very long,
and it is more difficult to identify errors. As many of the requirements for this system
and other control systems deal with system performance over time, adding a notion
of time to SpeAR and AGREE would also be exceptionally useful. One workaround
for this gap is to include time as an additional state that increments by the time step
defined by the system rate. A built-in notion of time would simplify the expression
of time-dependent properties.
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SpeAR could also be improved with changes to the interface and unit expression
capabilities. The current version of SpeAR allows the user to define the interface of
the subsystem with named and typed inputs and outputs. However, while it currently
allows inputs to be expressed separately, outputs are defined as a unique type that
contains all the outputs of the system. Future versions of SpeAR will allow the user
to express each output of a system separately. One of the promising features of
SpeAR is its ability to perform unit checking on basic units. However, when more
complex units were utilized in this example, SpeAR was not able to perform correct
unit checking. This issue will also be addressed in the next version of SpeAR.
Though SLDV was the most mature of any of the formal methods tools, there
were still several challenges that needed to be worked through during development.
Initially analysis of any of the properties in SLDV produced errors, so an updated,
2015a version was used. This allowed some properties to be proven, some to be vio-
lated, and some that produced an “undecided due to nonlinearities” error. It didnt
make sense for there to be such a variety of analysis results because all four reaction
wheel commands are bounded using the exact same equations in the controller design.
After this perplexing development, software developers at MathWorks were contacted
who recommended only trying to prove one property at a time. By implementing this
workaround, the four properties regarding reaction wheel acceleration where proven
with no changes to the model, however the velocity properties were violated. This
time though, counterexamples (an example of how a property can be violated) were
presented for the wheel that showed the property could be violated if the angular
velocity of the wheels exceeded the maximum allowable angular velocity before the
control system had an opportunity to initiate control. To remedy this, an assumption
was added that the previous value of the angular velocity was not greater than the
maximum allowable angular velocity. This assumption constrains the formal analysis
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tools to only search spaces in which the angular velocity doesnt start larger than the
maximum before the control initiates. The inability to analyze all the properties at
once was identified as a bug and the controller, properties, and verification models
generated to do this analysis were sent to MathWorks. MathWorks identified what
was causing the unintended behavior, provided workarounds in the model configura-
tion, and will fix it in a future release.[62] Another major limitation of SLDV is its
inability to conduct compositional verification of a system based on its components.
For example, in this research, analysis of the RTA controller in SLDV yielded ”unde-
cided due to nonlinearies” errors. It is possible that this capability will be added in
future releases.
6.4 Recommendations for Future Work
This section presents and discusses several gaps and opportunities for expansion
of the research presented in this thesis.
6.4.1 Robustness and Resiliency Analysis
The models used in this research are deterministic; however, the initial system
state and variations in the environment, aging of components, and other factors make
the behavior of this controller design on an actual system non deterministic, and
could be modeled in future work to study the robustness of the system and analysis
techniques.
6.4.2 Hypothesis Testing Formal Methods Analysis Approach
Future research could apply the hypothesis testing approach presented in this
research to the FMA approach. Analyzing both the null and alternative hypothe-
sis would give extra confidence in the FMA verification evidence, by showing that
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the FMA was not providing spurious results. Future research could investigate ap-
propriate methodologies and evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the combined
hypothesis testing and FMA approach.
6.4.3 Hierarchical Requirement Development
All of the requirements presented in this research were presented in a flat, one
level structure. However, research could be done to develop hierarchical requirements
assigned to levels of the system or controller design where high level controller perfor-
mance may be the highest level and derived requirements could be assigned at lower
levels. Developing a methodology to hierarchically structure formal requirements and
determining how that might impact how FMA is conducted could be an area of future
study.
6.4.4 Formal Methods Analysis of Autocoded Software
This research could be expanded by linearizing the 6U CubeSat model, compar-
ing the linear model performance to the nonlinear model, and conducting the formal
methods analyses described in this paper. In addition, the abrupt saturation limits of
the reaction wheels will need to be addressed in the formal methods analysis. Next,
C code from the Simulink model could be analyzed using Mathworks Polyspace Bug
Finder and Polyspace Code Prover.[6] The C code could be implemented on the AFIT
6U CubeSat Testbed attitude control subsystem and tests could be conducted to char-
acterize the actual performance of the system. These test results could be combined
with the simulation and formal methods analysis results to create an assurance case.
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6.4.5 Alternative Reachability Analysis Techniques
In this research, some insight was gained into the system reachability through
batch simulations; however, the use of alternative reachability analysis techniques
such as a Flow* [27] simulation of reachable system states, or that presented by Lewis
[65] or Bradley et al. [21] were left for future work. At the time of the publication of
this thesis, the author is currently developing a hybrid system reachability simulation
and anticipates publishing the results at a later date.
6.4.6 Additional Run Time Assurance Work
This work could be expanded in the future with the addition of mode logic, the use
of two or more actuators, the use of three or more controllers within the RTA controller
architecture, and the introduction of an intelligent controller. Mode logic could be
added to deal with faults or situations outside of the systems current operating range.
For example, the current design is limited by an assumption that the reaction wheels
are not spinning above the maximum rate before the controller can react; however,
this situation is possible if a fault occurs. Incorporating mode logic to react to this
situation will allow the removal of this assumption.
Using two or more actuators will also make the control system more resilient. For
example, the current control system design is intended to slew a satellite from rest
in one position to rest in another position; however CubeSats can experience large
angular velocities after being ejected from a CubeSat launcher and attempting to
slow the spacecraft angular velocity with only a reaction wheel array actuator can
cause the reaction wheels to saturate, a condition that occurs when a reaction wheel
reaches a velocity limit that prevents it from exerting additional influence on the
spacecraft attitude. Incorporating mode logic and an external torque actuator such
as a magnetic torque coil, which interacts with the Earths magnetic field to control
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the spacecraft attitude, could make the spacecraft more resilient. Information on
magnetic torque coils and initial development of an architecture and simulation with
a dual-actuated ACS is presented in Appendix II in Chapter VIII.
The RTA controller design presented in this paper only features two controllers:
verified and unverified. Future iterations could include three or more controllers,
where the decision module functions more like a negotiator that prioritizes control
tasks based on the current spacecraft state as well as the output of the control tasks
it is monitoring. A third controller within the RTA control architecture could be used
to transition from one controller to another, or provide functionality to deal with a
specific fault. Finally, the unverified controller block could play host to an artificially
intelligent or learning controller that provides a more optimal control approach.
6.4.7 Floating Point Math Error Estimation
One of the gaps in the FMA process presented in this paper is quantifying the
robustness of the analysis to calculation errors. Future work could also be conducted
in making guarantees about the robustness of the system to errors in the floating
point math used to estimate the equations of motion. Using a tool such as ASTREE
[37], to quantify the worst case floating point error for each calculation, the designer
could use the model checker to explore the tolerance of the guarantees to that error.
6.4.8 Reducing Abstraction
Effects such as integrator windup, timing delays, and sampling delays and their
impact on the analysis results are abstracted out of this research but could be explored
in future work. In this work, the sensors were abstracted and perfect truth data was
used. Sensors and the impact of noise could be modeled and analyzed in future work
to understand its impact on the verification evidence.
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6.4.9 Simulation Error Reduction
In this research, the discrete simulations were conducted using a fixed-step Euler
approximation solver for the change in system state at each timestep. Future work
could investigate the processing time versus simulation error for different discrete fixed
step solvers such as a second-order Heun method, a third-order Bogacki-Shampine
method, or a fourth-order Runge-Kutta (RK4) method.[5]
6.5 Formal Methods Analysis Availability
The SpeAR, AADL/AGREE, and Simulink/SLDV files used to conduct the FMA
in this research have been publically released with case number 88ABW-2015-6168
and are available on GitHub at https://github.com/AFRL-VVCAS/6UCubeSat.
SpeAR and AADL/AGREE are open source products, and Simulink and SLDV are
available through MathWorks.
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VII. Appendix I: Hardware Characterization
To verify models used to simulate the ACS, several measurements were taken and
behavior was compared to expectations. First, the mass moment of inertia (MOI)
of the wheel and Maxon motor[72] (the rotating components of the reaction wheel
array) was measured about the spin axis of the reaction wheel using the Model XR250
Measurement Instrument.[66] To reduce error, the average of four measurements was
used, and the electrical cabling was tucked as seen Figure 65.
Figure 65. MOI Test Setup for Single Reaction Wheel and Motor
The measured MOI was an order of magnitude larger than the MOI predicted
in a CAD model of the reaction wheel. Second, the MOI of the ADCS testbed was
measured about the z-axis using the XR250. A tare was taken with a hollow plastic
box on top (to be used to hold the spherical air bearing interface at the base of the
testbed). Two reduce error, three measurements were taken, and the testbed was
centered on the instrument and adjusted until it was measured level across the top
with two perpendicular measurements. The test setup is shown in Figure 66.
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Figure 66. MOI Test Setup for Testbed Z-axis
The measured MOI of the ADCS testbed was 0.475 kg-m2. Third, a modified
version of the attitude control C code developed by Tibbs [92] was set to command
a large acceleration until a large velocity was attained, and the steady state angular
velocity of the reaction wheels was measured using a laser tachometer. The electronics
board used to command the reaction wheels only facilitates three commands, so
only three wheels were spinning. There was no variation in the measurement so one
measurement was recorded for each wheel. The measured angular velocities of the
reaction wheels are shown in Table 20.
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Table 20. Measured Reaction Wheel Rotation Rates
Wheel rad/s rpm
1 549.5 5247
2 576.2 5500
3 534.1 5100
Fourth, the testbed was placed on the air bearing at rest in an off state and then
turned on. Once the reaction wheels had reached their steady state speed, the period
of rotation of the testbed about the z-axis was measured. The rotation rate and
period of the testbed about the z-axis was compared to a predicted rotation rate
and period calculated from the measured wheel and motor MOI, the measured z-axis
testbed MOI, and the rotation rate of the wheels. The comparison is summarized in
Table 20.
Table 21. Measured and Predicted ADCS Testbed Angular Velocity and Period
Source Velocity Period
Predicted 0.10 rad/s 62 s
Observed 0.22 rad/s 29 s
% Difference 112 % 53%
The predicted period was twice the length of the observed period and after exam-
ining several environmental factors such as air drag, imperfections in the air bearing,
and wobble in the test bed which should all decrease speed, not increase it as seen, it
was determined that a measurement error was to blame. The least reliable measure-
ment was that of the reaction wheel MOI as the instrument used is intended for much
larger objects up to 250 lbs, although the MOI measurement is technically larger than
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the MOI measurement error of 2.92639e-07 kg-m2 . Smaller MOI measuring devices
exist for more precise measurements. Based on observed period, measured wheel
speeds, and measured MOI of the testbed, a new predicted reaction wheel of 8.8e-05
kg-m2 was calculated. The different reaction wheel MOI values are summarized in
Table 22.
Table 22. Reaction Wheel MOI Measurement and Predictions
Source Value
Measured MOI 4.12×10−5kg-m2
CAD-Predicted MOI 5.85×10−6kg-m2
Experiment-Predicted MOI 8.80×10−5kg-m2
The measured MOI was used in the simulations for this research. The source
of the error in the CAD-predicted MOI was determined to be the selection of the
incorrect material for the reaction wheel model, which has since been corrected.
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VIII. Appendix II: Magnetic Torque Coils
Appendix II includes information on magnetic torque coil actuation and simulation
as an avenue for future work in RTA, in which multiple verified controllers may be
used to deal with different spacecraft modes or ACS actuator faults.
8.1 Magnetic Torque Coil Simulation Assumptions
It is assumed that no external torques beyond that applied by the ACS actuators,
such as gravity gradient or aero torques, are acting on the CubeSat. The magnetic
field of the Earth is modeled using the 11th generation of the International Geo-
magnetic Reference Field (IGRF). For the purposes of simulating magnetic torque,
the spacecraft is assumed to be in a circular, equatorial orbit at an altitude of 400
kilometers on January 1, 2000.
8.2 AFIT Magnetic Torque Coils
The AFIT magnetic torque coils are comprised of 30 gage copper wire wrapped
in 400 turns around a plastic frame and mount with an area of 0.0036 m2, and are
provided 500 mA, resulting in a maximum magnetic dipole moment of 0.72 A-m2.[40]
This coil design is pictured in Figure 67.
Figure 67. AFIT’s Magnetic Torque Coil[40]
151
In the AFIT 6U CubeSat ADCS Testbed, there are 3 magnetic torque coils, each
aligned with the body frame axes of the spacecraft. While the magnetic torque coils
may be placed anywhere in the chassis as long as they are in an orthogonal orientation
for 3-axis control, they are designed to be mounted inside the faces of the chassis as
demonstrated in Figure 68.
Figure 68. Three Magnetic Torque Coils Installed in a Plastic Chassis [12]
8.3 Magnetic Torque Coil Actuation
Magnetic torque coil arrays generate torque perpendicular to the Earth’s magnetic
field by applying electric current through a coiled wire. Unlike reaction wheel arrays,
which generate an internal torque that does not change the total angular momen-
tum of the spacecraft, magnetic torque coils produce an external torque which can
increase or reduce the spacecraft’s total angular momentum and are commonly used
to desaturate momentum exchange devices. The external torque is also very useful
for detumbling the spacecraft and placing it in a stable attitude relative to Earth’s
magnetic field. While magnetic torque coils have several advantages, their ability to
provide attitude control is limited by the spacecraft’s orientation and orbital position
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relative to the direction of Earth’s magnetic field. Magnetic torque coils produce less
precise than many other actuators with a typical precision no better than 1 degree,
and can interfere with onboard magnetometers; however, magnetic torque rods do not
require any fuel.[96][22][51] The magnetic dipole moment ~µ generated by a magnetic
torque coil with an air core is
µ = nIA (48)
where n is the number of turns in the wire, I is the current passing through the wire
and A is the cross sectional area of the space enclosed by the coil.[96]
The magnetic torque ~τ produced by a single torque coil is calculated from
~τ = ~µ× ~B (49)
where ~B is the magnetic field vector of the Earth in the spacecraft body frame.[96]
Arranging 3 magnetic torque coils orthogonal to one another in the spacecraft enables
2-axis attitude control. The torque vector (~τ) generated by aligning identical magnetic
torque coils with each of the body frame axes of the spacecraft is found from
~τ = − ~B×P t~µ (50)
where ~B× is a skew-symmetric matrix of components of ~B and P t is a 3×3 identity
matrix corresponding to the alignment of the magnetic torque coils with the body
frame axes of the spacecraft.
8.4 Magnetic Torque Coil Desaturation of the Reaction Wheel Array
Due to the redundancy of a 4-wheel RWA, a unique control solution does not exist
and a simple cross product law cannot be used to determine the magnetic torque
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required to desaturate the reaction wheels. A method to desaturate a redundant
reaction wheel array using a feedback term u¯∗ presented by Hogan and Schaub [60]
is shown here as
u¯∗ = −kD~ψ (51)
where k is a constant gain, D is the reaction wheel moment of inertia about the axis of
spin, and ~ψ is the vector of reaction wheel angular velocities. The resulting magnetic
dipole moment µ¯∗ generated by a magnetic torque coil is calculated from
µ¯∗ = −( ~B×Pt)+
[
1
D
S
]
u¯∗ (52)
where the superscript + represents the pseudoinverse of the matrix. The resulting
torque ~τ ∗ produced by the magnetic torque coil’s interaction with Earth’s magnetic
field may be calculated from
~τ ∗ = − ~B×Ptµ¯∗. (53)
While the torque generated by the torque coils would ideally be equal and opposite
the torque generated by the reaction wheels (~τ ∗ + ~hrwa = 0), this rarely happens, so
Hogan and Schaub recommend the addition of another term ∆u¯ to account for the
difference, as
∆u¯ =
[ 1
D
S
]+
(~τ ∗ −
[
1
D
S
]
u¯∗). (54)
When added to the current reaction wheel angular momentum ~hrwa and the feedback
term u¯∗, the new commanded change in reaction wheel angular momentum becomes
~hrwac = ~hrwa + u¯
∗ + ∆u¯ =
[ 1
D
S
]×
(~τ ∗ −
[ 1
D
S
]
u¯∗). (55)
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8.5 Equations of Motion with Torque Coil and Reaction Wheel Arrays
In this section, the state derivative equations of motion for a system with RWA
and magnetic torque control are presented.
The state vector x¯ is defined here as:
x¯ =
[
q¯ ~ω ~ψ
]T
=
[
q1, q2, q3, q4, ω1, ω2, ω3, ψ1, ψ2, ψ3, ψ4
]T
(56)
where the q terms are the elements of the quaternion describing the orientation, the ω
terms are the spacecraft angular velocity about each principal axis, and the ψ terms
are the angular velocity of each of the reaction wheels. The time rate of change of
the state can then be expressed as: [88][60]
˙¯x =

04×4 0.5Q4×3 04×4
03×4 −I−1ω×I −I−1ω×S
04×4 04×3 L4×4
 x¯−

04×4
I−1
04×3
S ~˙ψ +

04×4
I−1
04×3
 ~M +

04×4
03×4
U 4×4
 ~˙ψ (57)
where ~M is a vector of external torques acting on the spacecraft body axes, U 4×4 is
a 4×4 identity matrix, Q4×3 is
Q4×3 =

q4 −q3 q2
q3 q4 −q1
−q2 q1 q4
−q1 −q2 −q3

(58)
and L4×4 is the evolution of the wheel speeds as a function of the magnetic field,
calculated from
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L4×4 = −k ∗
(
U 4×4 +
[ 1
D
S
]+(
B×P t(B×P t)+ −U 3×3
)[ 1
D
S
])
. (59)
8.6 Compositionaal Architecture with Magnetic Torque Coils
In Section 4.3.1, the compositional architecture of the system was described. In
the model with magnetic torque coils, the coils are also broken down individually
in the architecture. The flow of signals between the components for the model that
includes magnetic torque coils is depicted in Figure 69. When the magnetic torque
coils are included, a commanded magnetic dipole moment is sent to each coil. The
resulting torque generated by the magnetic torque coil array is added to the total
spacecraft structure angular momentum in the structure.
Figure 69. 6U CubeSat Singal Flow for Model with Reaction Wheel Array and Mag-
netic Torque Coil Actuation
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8.7 Simulation of PID Control with Reaction Wheel and Magnetic Torque
Coil Actuation
Using the methods, assumptions, and constants from Sections 4.6, 4.7.1, and 4.7.2,
a simulation was conducted to show the system requirements are met by the PID con-
troller design that uses magnetic torque coils to dump momentum from the reaction
wheels. Just as seen in the reaction wheel only case, all of the testable requirements
are met in this simulation. A summary of the settling times, rise time, and percent
overshoot is displayed in Table 23.
Table 23. Control Systems Analysis Requirements Summary for Simulation with Mag-
netic Torque Coils and Reaction Wheel Array
Req’t Variable Value units
R10 Ts2% 11.4 s
R11 Ts5% 12.7 s
R12 Tωmax 7.8 s
R13 %OS 13.16 %
Just as seen in Section 5.3.1, plots were created as shown in Figure 70 and Fig-
ure 71, to show satisfaction of these requirements.
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Figure 70. Performance Requirements for Simulation with Magnetic Torque Coils and
Reaction Wheel Array
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Figure 71. Control Systems Analysis Requirements for Simulation with Magnetic
Torque Coils and Reaction Wheel Array
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